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ABSTRACT
The dissertation consists of two essays in misallocation and development. In par-
ticular, the essays explore how government policies distort resource allocation across
production units, and therefore affect aggregate economic and environmental out-
comes.
The first chapter studies the aggregate consequences of misallocation in a firm
dynamics model with multi-establishment firms. I calibrate my model to the US firm
size distribution with respect to both the number of employees and the number of
establishments, and use it to study distortions that are correlated with establishment
size, or so-called size-dependent distortions to establishments, which are modeled as
implicit output taxes. In contrast to previous studies, I find that size-dependent
distortions are not more damaging to aggregate productivity and output than size-
independent distortions, while the implicit tax revenue approximately summarizes
the effects on aggregate output. I also use the model to compare the effects of size-
dependent distortions to establishments and to firms, and find that they have different
effects on firm size distribution, but have similar effects on aggregate output.
The second chapter studies the effects of product market frictions on firm size
distribution and their implications for industrial pollution in China. Using a unique
micro-level manufacturing census, I find that larger firms generate and emit less
pollutants per unit of production. I also provide evidence suggesting the existence of
size-dependent product market frictions that disproportionately affect larger firms.
Using a model with firms heterogeneous in productivity and an endogenous choice of
pollution treatment technology, I show that these frictions result in lower adoption
rate of clean technology, higher pollution and lower aggregate output. I use the
model to evaluate policies that eliminate size-dependent frictions, and those that
increase environmental regulation. Quantitative results show that eliminating size-
i
dependent frictions increases output by 30%. Meanwhile, the fraction of firms using
clean technology increases by 27% and aggregate pollution decreases by 20%. In
contrast, a regulatory policy which increases the clean technology adoption rate by
the same 27%, has no effect on aggregate output and leads to only 10% reduction in
aggregate pollution.
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Chapter 1
MULTI-ESTABLISHMENT FIRMS, MISALLOCATION AND PRODUCTIVITY
1.1 Introduction
Misallocation of resources among production units can potentially cause large
losses in aggregate productivity, and therefore can play a large role in explaining the
income disparity across countries. 1 An important task then is to identify insti-
tutional and policy distortions that are more damaging to aggregate productivity,
and therefore are more relevant in explaining the income disparity. A growing liter-
ature argues that size-dependent distortions, or distortions that are correlated with
the size of production units, are a good candidate, because they reallocate resources
from high-productivity to low-productivity production units. 2 Consistent with this
story, there are large differences in the size of production units across countries. 3
In this paper, I study the aggregate consequences of misallocation in a firm dynam-
ics model with multi-establishment firms. In particular, I use the model to reassess
the aggregate effects of size-dependent distortions to establishments, which are the fo-
cus of the previous studies. In contrast to previous findings, I find that size-dependent
distortions are not more damaging to aggregate productivity than size-independent
distortions, when they impose the same total burden on the whole business sector.
The presence of multi-establishment firms plays a key role in driving this result.
While the typical analysis in the literature assumes that firms operate only one es-
1Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), and Guner et al. (2008) among others.
See Restuccia and Rogerson (2013) for a review of the recent literature.
2Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Guner et al. (2008) among others.
3Bento and Restuccia (2014) and Lagakos (2016) document large cross-country differences in the
size of manufacturing and retail establishments respectively.
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Figure 1.1: The Number and Employment Size of Establishments in the U.S. Firms
of Different Employment Sizes
tablishment, most large firms in advanced economies operate multiple establishments.
Figure 1 shows the average number and average employment size of establishments in
the U.S. of firms with different employment sizes in 2003. Among firms with at least
100 employees, the average number of establishments rises almost log-linearly with
firm employment size, while the average employment size of establishments hardly
changes with firm employment size. This suggests that the extensive margin of cre-
ating additional establishments is crucial for the growth of large firms.
The presence of the extensive margin of creating additional establishments has
important implications for the assessment of the aggregate consequences of misallo-
2
cation. To begin with, changing the number of establishments provides large firms
with an additional margin of adjustment when they face distortions. This margin
is important if there are size-dependent distortions to establishments, for example,
policies that limit the size of manufacturing establishments in India and the size of
retail establishments in Japan as in Guner et al. (2008), because firms can react to
them by operating a larger number of establishments with smaller size.
Moreover, the presence of the extensive margin is crucial for understanding the
forces that drive the growth of large firms. When large firms grow by creating new
establishments, the growth is not only driven by their investment in new intangible
capital, such as the creation of new patents and new blueprints, but also by utiliza-
tion of their existing intangible capital in new locations. Without taking the extensive
margin of firm growth into account, we may overstate large firms’ investment in in-
tangible capital. The correlation between firm size and investment in new intangible
capital is important for the effects of size-dependent distortions on aggregate produc-
tivity. If large firms invest more in intangible capital, size-dependent distortions not
only cause static misallocation of resources given the productivity distribution, but
also discourage investment in intangible capital. However, if small firms invest more
in intangible capital, then by restricting the operations of large establishments and
firms, size-dependent distortions make room for more small firms with high invest-
ment in intangible capital, which would largely offset the negative effects on aggregate
productivity from the static misallocation of resources.
In addition, various institutional and policy distortions induce misallocation of
resources among firms instead of establishments. For example, financial frictions are
likely to affect the operations of the whole firm and labor unions are more likely to
target establishments that are part of multi-establishment firms. 4 There are also
4See Dinlersoz et al. (2014).
3
restrictions on the creation of establishments by multi-establishment firms. Notable
examples include geographic restrictions on the US banking industry before the 1990s,
which limited the ability to choose branch locations, and restrictions on the entry of
large international retail chains in India’s retail industry. These restrictions can po-
tentially cause substantial losses to aggregate productivity since they tend to restrict
the operations of productive firms, but standard heterogeneous firm models are not
well suited to studying their consequences. 5
Motivated by the potential importance of multi-establishment firms for misalloca-
tion and aggregate productivity, I build a model of multi-establishment firms based on
the standard equilibrium model of firm dynamics along the lines of Hopenhayn (1992),
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Veracierto (2001). I add two new elements to
the standard model: technology capital and multi-establishment firms. Technology
capital measures the stock of firm’s unique know-how from investing in R&D, brands,
and organization capital, which can be used simultaneously by all establishments op-
erated by a firm. 6 Because it is non-rival, technology capital provides a rationale
for the existence of multi-establishment firms.
My model has the following features. The establishment is the basic production
unit in the model while the firm is the decision-making unit. In addition to labor and
physical capital, establishments use two different types of intangible capital as inputs
of production: technology capital that is non-rival and establishment-specific intan-
gible capital that is rival. Firm also can choose to operate multiple establishments
5One motivation comes from the importance of resource reallocation from single-establishment
to multi-establishment firms in aggregate productivity growth. For example, Foster et al. (2006)
find that the entry of high-productivity establishments that belong to large national retail chains
and the exit of low-productivity single-establishment firms have played a dominant role in aggregate
productivity gains in the US retail trade sector.
6See McGrattan and Prescott (2009, 2010). Markusen (1984) develops a similar concept named
knowledge capital, which measures the stock of firm’s intangible assets that have a joint-input
characteristic
4
at a cost. Hence, in addition to standard decisions, firms make two extra decisions:
the amount of investment in intangible capital and the number of establishments in
operation.
The non-rivalry of technology capital leads to the economies of multi-establishment
operations: given the same amount of inputs, firms with more establishments produce
more output because the technology capital they own can be used simultaneously by
more establishments. This has important implications for firm and establishment
sizes, and can be used to infer the importance of technology capital in firm produc-
tion. If technology capital is more important in firm production, large firms will
expand more along the extensive margin and operate more establishments, but the
size of their establishments will be smaller.
I calibrate the model to match salient features of the firm size distribution with
respect to both the number of employees and the number of establishments in the
US. Despite its simplicity, the model does a surprisingly good job in matching the
whole firm size distribution. As a by-product of the calibration, I obtain an estimate
the importance of technology capital in production. It is reassuring that my estimate
is roughly consistent with the findings in previous studies. 7 I use the calibrated
model to evaluate the effects of size-dependent distortions to establishments, which
are the focus of previous studies and modeled as implicit output taxes.
In contrast to the findings in previous studies, I find that size-dependent dis-
tortions are not more damaging to aggregate productivity and output than size-
independent distortions, if they impose the same burden on the whole business sec-
tor, measured by the implicit tax revenue. In addition, the effects of distortions on
aggregate output are approximately summarized by the implicit tax revenue from the
distortions: distortions with different degree of size dependency have similar effects
7 McGrattan and Prescott (2010) and Kapika (2012)
5
on aggregate output if the same amount of implicit tax revenue is collected. This
result suggests an important implication for empirical studies on misallocation: in
order to identify distortions that are more damaging to aggregate productivity and
output, we should pay more attention to distortion that impose larger burden on the
whole business sector, instead of distortions that are more correlated establishment
size.
The presence of the extensive margin of creating additional establishments plays a
key role in this result. It provides large firms with an additional margin of adjustment,
and is crucial for model predictions on large firms’ investment in intangible capital.
To highlight the importance of the extensive margin for the result, I redo the above
exercise in a model which is identical to my model except that there is no technology
capital, so every firm operates only one establishment, and is calibrated to match the
US firm size distribution with respect to number of employees only. I find that large
firm invest more in intangible capital in that model, and size-dependent distortions
are more damaging to aggregate productivity and output than size-independent.
I also use the model to compare effects of size-dependent distortions to establish-
ments and to firms. I find that these two forms of distortions have very different
effects on firm size distribution. Size-dependent distortions to establishments induce
multi-establishment firms to have a larger number of smaller establishments, while
size-dependent distortions to firms induce a much larger reduction in mean firm size
and the number of establishments per firm. However, their effects on aggregate output
are similar. This suggests another implication for empirical studies on misallocation:
cross-country differences in firm size distributions alone do not tell us much about
the distortionary effects on aggregate productivity and output.
In addition, I use the model to study restrictions on establishment creation, and
find that they induce induce a large reduction in mean firm size and the number of
6
establishments per firm. However, the effects of these restrictions on output depends
on whether they apply to a small sector, in which case wage is approximately fixed,
or apply to the whole economy in which case wage adjusts endogenously. Restrictions
that apply to a smaller sector would cause a big drop in the output of that sector, while
restrictions that apply to the whole economy have a small impact on the aggregate
output.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 illustrates key features
of technology capital and multi-establishment operations in a simple static model.
Section 3 describes the formal model with firm dynamics. Section 4 discusses the
calibration of the dynamic model. Section 5 analyzes size-dependent distortions to
establishments and firms, and restrictions on establishment creation. Section 6 con-
cludes. All figures and tables are at the end of the paper.
1.2 A Static Model
In this section, I build a static model of heterogeneous firms that captures the
key features of technology capital and multi-establishment firms, and use the model
to show explicitly how distortions affect firms’ decisions, firm size distribution and
aggregate productivity. In Section 3, I will generalize this static model to the full
blown dynamic model that I will connect with the data.
1.2.1 Model Environment
There is a continuum of firms with measure normalized to 1. Each firm is endowed
with a stock of intangible capital x, which is drawn from a probability density function
φ(x). Firms use intangible capital x to produce technology capital zf , which is non-
rival within a firm and can be used simultaneously by all the establishments in a
firm, and establishment-specific intangible capital ze that is rival, using the following
7
technology
zf + ze ≤ x (1.1)
Examples of technology capital zf are blueprints and patents owned by a firm,
and a firm’s brands and reputations. Examples of establishment specific intangible
capital ze are local customer base of a specific establishment in a firm, and a manager’s
knowledge about local production conditions.
The establishment is the basic production unit in this economy, and firms can
operate multiple establishments. An establishment uses technology capital zf , es-
tablishment specific intangible capital ze, and labor h to produce the final good y,
according to the following production technology:
y = f(zf , ze, h) = (z
α
f z
1−α
e )
1−γhγ (1.2)
where α, γ ∈ (0, 1). α determines the importance of technology capital zf in estab-
lishment production, and 1−γ measures the importance of intangible capital. A firm
needs to hire τ units of labor to create and operate an establishment.
Finally, the total endowment of labor in the economy is H, which is supplied
inelastically.
1.2.2 Firm Optimization Problem
The firm optimization problem can be decomposed into two stages. In the second
stage, firms solve an output maximization problem: given the amount of intangible
capital x, the number of establishments n, and the total amount of labor h in a firm,
the firm chooses {zf , ze,j, hj}nj=1 to maximize the output it produces, where zf , ze,j
and hj are technology capital, establishment specific intangible capital and labor used
by establishment j of the firm, respectively. In Stage 1, the firm chooses the number
of establishments n and the amount of labor h to maximize its profit.
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In Stage 2, given the amount of production inputs {x, h} and the number of
establishments n, the firm chooses {zf , ze,j, hj}nj=1 to solve the following output-
maximization problem
F (x, n, h) = max
{hj ,kj}
n∑
j=1
f(zf , ze,j, hj) (1.3)
s.t.
n∑
j=1
hj ≤ h,
n∑
j=1
ze,j ≤ ze, ze + zf ≤ x
Notice that given the non-rival nature of technology capital, the firm does not need
to allocate zf among the establishments it operates. Given that all establishments
have the same production function, the solution to this problem is
hj =
h
n
, ze,j =
ze
n
ze = (1− α)x, zf = αx
That is, all establishments in the firm use the same amount of establishment specific
intangible capital and labor, and a share α of the intangible capital x is used to pro-
duce technology capital. Substituting the solution into (1.3), the production function
of the firm can be written as
F (n, x, h) = Ω(nαx)1−γhγ (1.4)
Unlike standard models of firm heterogeneity, the firm’s output in this model is not
only determined by the amount of intangible capital x, but also by the number of es-
tablishments it operates, n, which captures the scale economies of multi-establishment
operations. Notice that the parameter which determines the importance of technology
capital in establishment production, α, is precisely the parameter which determines
the scale economies of multi-establishment operations. An immediate implication of
this observation is that, data on firms’ multi-establishment operations provide impor-
tant information on the magnitude of α.
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In Stage 1, given wage w, a firm with intangible capital x chooses {n, h} to
maximize its profit
pi(x) = max
n,h
Ω(nαx)1−γhγ − wh− τwn
and the optimal solution is
h(x) = A(α, γ)x
1
1−α τ
α
α−1w
1
(α−1)(1−γ) (1.5)
n(x) = B(α, γ)x
1
1−α τ
1
α−1w
1
(α−1)(1−γ) (1.6)
h(x)
n(x)
=
γ
(1− γ)
τ
α
(1.7)
Quite intuitively, these equations say that both the amount of production labor
h(x) and the number of establishments n(x) in the firm are increasing in x and de-
creasing in τ and w. That is, firms with a larger amount of intangible capital use
more labor and operate more establishments. Moreover, the amount of labor used
by each establishment, h(x)/n(x), is independent of x, implying that differences in
firm employment size are caused solely by differences in number of establishments:
larger firms have more establishments, but not larger establishments. This seems at
odds with the US data at first glance. However, if we focus on multi-establishment
firms, the model provides a reasonable approximation of the data. Figure 1 shows
the average number and employment size of establishments in firms of different em-
ployment sizes on a log-log plot. For firms with more than 100 employees, average
establishment size does not rise or fall with firm employment size, which is consistent
with what the model predicts.
1.2.3 Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium in this economy consists of a list of {h(x), n(x)} and a
wage w such that
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1. Given wage w, {h(x), n(x)} solves the profit-maximization problem of a firm
with intangible capital x
2. The labor market clears ∫
(h(x) + τn(x))φ(dx) = H (1.8)
Notice that τn(x) is included in aggregate labor demand because the costs of
operating establishments are paid in terms of labor.
1.2.4 Size-Dependent Distortions
In this section, I use the model to evaluate the aggregate effects of size-dependent
distortions to establishments and to firms, i.e., distortions correlated with establish-
ment and firm sizes, respectively.
Size-dependent distortions are prevalent in both developed and developing coun-
tries. Guner et al. (2008) provide interesting examples of size-dependent distortions
in developed countries, such as the regulation of the retail sector in Japan and the
labor regulation in Italy. Using representative firm-level data in India, Indonesia and
Mexico, Hsieh and Olken (2014) find large firms have higher average products of cap-
ital and labor, suggesting large firms in those countries face higher input prices. This
particular type of size-dependent distortions, which restrict the operations of large
production units, are also emphasized in Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh
and Klenow (2014)). They tend to move resources from more to less productive units,
therefore causing substantial losses in aggregate productivity.
In a heterogeneous firm model with only single-establishment firms, size-dependent
distortions to establishments would produce the same aggregate effects as size-dependent
distortions to firms. This is no longer the case in a model with multi-establishment
firms. In the presence of distortions that restrict the operations of large establish-
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ments, firms that own multiple large establishments could respond by operating more
establishments of smaller sizes, and the amount of resources used by the whole firm
may not drop as much. In other words, size-dependent distortions to establishments
cause more misallocation within firms, while size-dependent distortions to firms cause
more misallocation across firms. My simple model can be used to illustrate these
points.
Size-Dependent Distortions to Establishments
I study the effects of size-dependent distortions to establishments, which are the
focus of previous studies such as Guner et al. (2008) and Restuccia and Rogerson
(2008). I introduce the following taxes whose rates rise with establishment output to
the benchmark economy: an establishment with output y faces a tax rate 1 − κy−ρ,
where 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. This tax function was first proposed by Benabou (2002) and has
been popular in the fields of development economics and public economics largely
due to its simplicity: the parameter κ determines the mean level of the taxes, while
ρ determines the size dependency of the taxes. When ρ = 0, all the establishments,
small or large, face the same tax rate 1 − κ. 8 In this case the tax scheme is
size-independent. When ρ > 0, establishments with a larger amount of output y face
higher tax rates.
The firm’s optimal choice involves dividing the rival inputs evenly across its es-
tablishments. Therefore firm’s problem can be written as
pi(x) = max
n,h,zf ,ze
κn[
(
zαf
(ze
n
)1−α)
1−γ
(
h
n
)γ
]1−ρ − wh− wτn
where zf + ze ≤ x. The solution is for any x and x′,
h(x)
h(x′)
=
n(x)
n(x′)
=
( x
x′
) 1
1−α
(1.9)
8See Guner et al. (2015) for a discussion of recent studies that use this tax function.
12
h(x)
n(x)
=
γ(1− ρ)
1− (γ + (1− α)(1− γ))(1− ρ) (1.10)
Equation (1.9) says the ratio of labor used in two firms is independent of ρ and κ.
Since aggregate labor supply is fixed, each firm would use the same amount of labor
as in the undistorted economy, and there’s no misallocation of labor across firms.
However, as made clear by Equation (1.10), the establishment size h(x)/n(x) is de-
creasing in ρ, so size-dependent distortions to establishments induce firms to expand
more along the extensive margin and operate a larger number of smaller establish-
ments. Therefore, in this simple model, size-dependent distortions to establishments
cause misallocation within firms rather than across firms.
Size-Dependent Distortions to Firms
Now I introduce the following size-dependent distortions to firms to the benchmark
economy. Specifically, a firm with output y faces a tax rate 1−κy−ρ, where 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
The parameter ρ determines the size dependency of the taxes: when ρ = 0, all the
firms face the same tax rate 1 − κ, and when ρ > 0, firms with larger output y face
higher tax rates.
Given the taxes and wage w, a firm with intangible capital x chooses {n, h} to
maximize its after-tax profit
pi(x) = max
n,h
κ(Ω(nαx)1−γhγ)1−ρ − wh− wτn
The optimal solution is
h(x) = A · x (1−γ)(1−ρ)β (1.11)
h(x)
n(x)
=
γτ
α(1− γ) (1.12)
where β = 1− (γ + α(1− γ))(1− ρ).
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As above, firms with a larger x use more labor and operate a larger number of
establishments, as both h(x) and n(x) are increasing in x. In addition, all estab-
lishments in the economy use the same amount of production labor, as h(x)/n(x) is
independent of x, which is not affected by ρ as well.
However, for any x and x′,
h(x)
h(x′)
=
( x
x′
) (1−γ)(1−ρ)
1−(γ+α(1−γ))(1−ρ)
(1.13)
(1−γ)(1−ρ)
1−(γ+α(1−γ))(1−ρ) is decreasing in ρ, implying that when ρ is larger, the ratio of the labor
used by firms x and x′ is smaller. Therefore, given the distribution of x, size-dependent
distortions to firms cause a more compressed firm employment size distribution. To
take stock, in contrast to size-dependent distortions to establishments, size-dependent
distortions to firms cause misallocation across firms rather than within firms in this
simple model. In the full blown dynamic model below, size-dependent distortions
cause misallocation both across and within firms, but the quantitative results confirm
the basic insight in this simple model: size-dependent distortions to establishments
cause more misallocation within firms, while size-dependent distortions to firms cause
more misallocation across firms.
To further exploit the effects of firm-level size-dependent distortions on aggregate
output, I assume x is distributed according to a log-normal distribution with mean µ
and standard deviation σ, i.e., φ(x) is a log-normal probability distribution function.
One can show that the aggregate output in the economy then is given by
log(Y ) = Γ(α, γ, τ) + (γ + (1− γ)α)log(H) + (1− γ)µ+ Ψ(ρ, α, γ)σ
2
2
(1.14)
where the function Ψ(ρ, α, γ) is strictly decreasing in ρ. Equation (1.14) has an
intuitive interpretation: aggregate output in this economy is determined by the total
amount of labor available in this economy, whose relative importance is γ+(1−γ)α, by
14
the mean value of the distribution of intangible capital, whose relative importance is
(1−γ)µ, and by the dispersion of firm size distribution, whose relative importance is a
function of the importance of technology capital α, the size-dependency of distortions
ρ and the dispersion of intangible capital σ. Since Ψ(ρ, α, γ) is strictly decreasing in
ρ, size dependent distortions reduce aggregate output precisely by compressing the
distribution of firm sizes.
Restrictions on Establishment Creation
The cost of operating an additional establishment, τ , is a key parameter of the model.
In the real world, τ is affected by both technological and institutional factors, such as
the communication cost between headquarters and affiliated establishments, the cost
headquarter managers incur to monitor the managers of affiliated establishments, and
the regulation of entry of establishments. 9 Technological advances in communica-
tion would reduce τ , while increases in the regulation of establishment entry would
raise τ .
Due to poor communication technology and infrastructure and high regulation
of entry, firms in developing countries usually face higher costs when they oper-
ate additional establishments. Another important factor that limits firms’ multi-
establishment operations is weak rule of law in developing countries. Bloom et al.
(2013) find the number of male family members is the dominant factor determining
the number of plants for Indian textile firms, which can be explained by weak rule
of law in India. In addition, when doing business in regions far away from their
headquarters, firms in developing countries may also have to pay large bribes to local
government officials.
There are also government policies which increase the costs of establishment cre-
9See Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and Head and Ries (2008)
15
ation. One example comes from the banking industry in the US. Historically, banks
in the US were limited in their ability to choose branch office locations. As late as
1974, only 14 states allowed statewide branching and 12 states prohibited branching
altogether, while the rest of the states allowed limited branching only. 10 The banks
faced even more severe restrictions when they wanted to own and operate branches
across state lines. The McFadden Act of 1927 specifically prohibited banks from
interstate branching, until the provision was repealed by the Riegle-Neal Interstate
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. Another example comes from In-
dia’s retail industry, a rapidly growing industry that accounts for more than 20% of
India’s GDP. Retail industry in India is characterized by small family-owned stores
with low labor productivity, which account for more than 90% of the market share.
Meanwhile, entry by large international retail chains is restricted, especially in the
multi-brand retail category. Until 2011, FDI was denied in multi-brand retail, and
large international retail chains like Wal-Mart and Carrefour were not allowed to op-
erate supermarkets or retail outlets in India. The model in this paper is well-suited
to studying the effects of these distortions.
I model the restrictions on establishment creation as an increase in τ , and study the
effects of restrictions that apply to a small sector, in which case wage w is determined
exogenously and will not be affected by the restrictions, and that restrictions that
apply to the whole economy, in which case wage w is determined endogenously and
will be affected by the restrictions.
I start with restrictions that apply to a small sector. Since the wage w is not
affected when the sector is small, according to Equations (1.5) and (1.6), both the
amount of production labor h(x) and the number of establishments n(x) drop for
each firm when τ increases. Meanwhile, from Equation (1.7) we see that the mean
10Jayaratne and Strahan (1997)
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employment size of establishments h(x)/n(x) rises. The intuition is, as the cost of
multi-establishment operations increases, firms choose to operate a smaller number
of establishments with larger employment sizes. As a result, total output Y in the
sector drops:
∂ln(Y )
∂ln(τ)
= − α
1− α
which implies that output drops more when α is larger, i.e., when technology capital
is more important for firm production.
Now I study restrictions that apply to the whole economy, in which case wage
w is determined endogenously by the labor market clearing condition and will be
affected by the restrictions. As before, the number of establishments n(x) drops
while the mean employment size of establishments h(x)/n(x) rises for each firm when
τ increases. However, given the fixed measure of firms and fixed aggregate labor
supply, the wage w will adjust in such a way that each firm will use the same amount
of labor as in the benchmark economy. Since firms operate an inefficiently smaller
number of establishments, aggregate output Y now drops by
∂ln(Y )
∂ln(τ)
= −α(1− γ)
Again, output drops more when α is larger. However, the output drops by a
smaller amount than the previous case for the same value of τ , which reflects the
importance of the general equilibrium effects.
Notice that in this simple model, these conclusions do not depend on the distri-
bution of intangible capital x.
1.3 A Dynamic Model
In this section, I make previous model dynamic and introduce two important
new elements to it: firm entry and exit; firm growth caused by intangible capital
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accumulation. Later I will use the dynamic model for quantitative analysis.
1.3.1 Establishments and Firms
Establishment is the basic production unit in this economy, which uses technology
capital zf , establishment specific intangible capital ze, and physical capital k and labor
h to produce the final good y, according to the following production technology:
y = f(zf , ze, k, h) = (z
α
f z
1−α
e )
1−γ(kηh1−η)γ
where α determines the importance of technology capital zf in establishment pro-
duction, 1 − γ measures the importance of intangible capital, and η determines the
relative importance of physical capital to labor.
A firm in each period is characterized by the amount of intangible capital it
owns, x. Intangible capital x can be used to produce technology capital zf and
establishment- specific intangible capital ze, with the following technology
zf + ze ≤ x
Firms can accumulate intangible capital x over time. If a firm with x uses It units
of labor for the accumulation of intangible capital, then in the next period the stock
of intangible capital would be
xt+1 = [(1− δx)xt + xθ1t Iθ2t ] exp(t+1) (1.15)
δx is the depreciation rate of intangible capital and t+1 is a shock whose value is
realized at the beginning of period t+ 1. As is evident from (1.15), both the current
stock of intangible capital xt and the investment on intangible capital It play a role
in the production of intangible capital, where θ1 determines the importance of the
current stock of intangible capital in the production of new intangible capital, while
θ2 determines the importance of investment It.
18
Firms can choose to operate multiple establishments. Firms need to use τe units of
labor to operate an additional establishment and this cost is not paid if firms operate
only one establishment. Therefore, the total operating cost to a firm n establishments
is
oc(n) =

(n− 1)τe n > 1
0 n = 1
The parameter τe captures the regulation of establishment entry, the communica-
tion cost between headquarters and affiliate establishments and the cost of monitoring
establishment managers and so forth.
There is an unlimited mass of potential entering firms. In each period, a new firm
can enter the economy after paying a sunk cost of τf measured in terms of labor.
Upon entry, the firm draws its initial level of intangible capital from a distribution
φ(x). The draws are i.i.d. across firms. Finally, with probability λ each firm is hit
by a shock that forces it to exit.
1.3.2 Household
There is a stand-in household that consists of a continuum of members with mea-
sure normalized 1. The household is infinitely lived and maximizes the lifetime utility
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct)
where Ct is consumption of the final good in period t.
In each period, the household is endowed with one unit of productive time, which
it supplies inelastically. The household owns the physical capital and firms.
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1.3.3 Stationary Equilibrium
I focus on a stationary equilibrium in which the equilibrium wage wt, the rental
price for physical capital Rt and interest rate rt are constant over time.
Incumbent Firm’s Problem
As in the static model, a firm’s static problem can be broken down into two stages. In
the second stage, the firm solves an output maximization problem: given intangible
capital x, the number of establishments n, and the amount of labor h and physical
capital k, the firm chooses inputs {zf , ze,j, kj, hj}nj=1 to maximize its output, where
(zf , ze,j, kj, hj) are the inputs used by establishment j in the firm. In Stage 2, the
firm chooses the number of establishments n , the amount of labor h and physical
capital k to maximize its profit.
In Stage 2, given the amount of production inputs {x, k, h} and the number of
establishments n in the firm, the firm chooses {zf , ze,j, kj, hj}nj=1 to solve the following
problem
F (x, n, k, h) = max
{hj ,kj}
n∑
j=1
f(zf , ze,j, kj, hj)
s.t.
n∑
j=1
kj ≤ k,
n∑
j=1
hj ≤ h
n∑
j=1
ze,j ≤ ze, ze + zf ≤ x
Notice that given the non-rival nature of technology capital, the firm does not need
to allocate zf among the establishments it operates. Given that all establishments
have the same production function, the solution to this problem is
kj =
k
n
, hj =
h
n
, ze,j =
ze
n
ze = (1− α)x, zf = αx
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Hence the firm production function is
F (x, n, k, h) = Ω(nαx)1−γ(kηh1−η)γ
As before, the firm’s output is determined not only by the amount of intangi-
ble capital x, but also by the number of establishments it operates, which captures
the scale economies of multi-establishment operations, and α determines the scale
economies of multi-establishment operations.
In Stage 1, given wage w and rental rate of capital R, a firm with intangible capital
x chooses {n, k, h} to maximize its profit
pi(x) = max
n≥1,k,h
{Ω(nαx)1−γ(kηh1−η)γ − wh−Rk − wτe(n− 1)}
There is a cutoff level xˆ such that firms with x < xˆ choose to operate only one
establishment, for any x, x′ < x¯
h(x)
h(x′)
=
( x
x′
)
(1.16)
while firms with x ≥ x¯ choose to operate multiple establishments, and any x, x′ > x¯
h(x)
h(x′)
=
( x
x′
) 1
1−α
(1.17)
In addition, mean establishment sizes in multi-establishment firms are
h(x)
n(x)
=
γ(1− η)
(1− γ)
τe
α
(1.18)
Figure 2 shows the model predictions on mean establishment size and number of
establishments in firms of different employment sizes. Comparing Figure 2 with Figure
1, which depicts mean establishment size and number of establishments in firms of
different employment sizes in the US data, we find that the model predictions capture
the key features of the data: most small firms are single-establishment firms, while
21
12
5
10
20
50
100
200
Firm Employment Size
1 10 100 1000 10000
Number of Establishments
Size of Establishments
Figure 1.2: The Number and Employment Size of Establishments in Firms of Dif-
ferent Employment Sizes in the Model: A Numerical Example
large firms typically operate multiple establishments, and average employment size
of establishment is roughly constant for those large firms.
Let V (x) be the value of a firm with intangible capital x, then
V (x) = max
n,h,k,I
{F (x, n, h, k)− wh−Rk − wτe(n− 1)− wI + 1− λ
1 + r
E[V (x′)|I, x]}
(1.19)
where
x′ = [(1− δx)x+ xθ1Iθ2 ] exp(′) (1.20)
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Entering Firm’s Problem
Entering firms pay a sunk cost of τf units of labor, and then draw an initial level of
intangible capital from distribution φ(x). Let VE be the present discounted value of
a potential entering firm:
VE =
∫
V (x)φ(dx)− wτf (1.21)
where τf denotes the entry cost.
In an equilibrium with firm entry, VE must be equal to zero since otherwise ad-
ditional firms would enter. Following the literature, I refer to the condition VE = 0
as the free-entry condition. Since VE is strictly decreasing in wage w, it follows that
there is a unique value of w for the free-entry condition to hold. Therefore, if there is
an equilibrium with firm entry, then the free-entry condition will determine the wage
rate w.
Household’s Problem
Given the wage wt and the rental price of physical capital Rt, the household’s problem
can be written as
max
{Ct,Kt}
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct)
subject to
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt ≤ wt +RtKt + Πt
where Kt is the total stock of physical capital, which depreciates at rate δ, and Πt is
the aggregate profits of all the incumbent firms in the economy in period t.
In a stationary equilibrium, the Euler equation determines the rental price of
physical capital R
R =
1
β
− 1 + δ
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It follows that in a stationary equilibrium, the interest rate r is determined solely
by the discount factor β
r = R− δ = 1
β
− 1
Definition of A Stationary Equilibrium
A stationary competitive equilibrium with firm entry consists of a wage rate w, a
real interest rate r, a rental price of physical capital R, a distribution of firms µ(x)
, a mass of firm entry E, a value function for incumbent firms V (x) and a value of
entering firms VE , policy functions {n(x), k(x), h(x), I(x)} for incumbent firms, and
aggregate levels of consumption C and physical capital K such that the following
conditions are satisfied:
1. Consumer optimization:
r =
1
β
− 1
2. Firm optimization: Given prices (w,R) , the function V (x) solves the incumbent
firms’ problem and {n(x), k(x), h(x), I(x)} are optimal policy functions.
3. Free-entry condition:
VE =
∫
V (x)φ(dx)− wτf (1.22)
4. Market clearing: ∫
[h(x) + n(x)τe + h(x)]dµ(x) + Eτf = 1∫
k(x)dµ(x) = K
C + δK =
∫
F (x, n(x), k(x), h(x))dµ(x)
5. µ is an invariant distribution.
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1.4 Calibration
I assume the US is a distortion-free economy and calibrate the model parameters
to match the key aspects of the US data at the aggregate and cross section levels.
Some parameters are chosen to match the aggregate level data in the US. A model
period is chosen to be one year. Following Guner et al. (2008), I assume the stock of
physical capital consists of business equipment and structures, business inventories
and business land. For the period 1960–2000, the physical capital to measured GDP
ratio averaged about 2.33, the share of physical capital in measured GDP is 0.32,
while the ratio of investment in physical capital to GDP is 0.14. The discount factor
β is chosen to match the physical capital to GDP ratio, and the depreciation rate
of physical capital δ is chosen to match the ratio of investment in physical capital
to GDP. The parameter that determines the relative importance of physical capital
in production, η, joint with the span-of-control parameter γ, determines the share
of physical capital in GDP. The literature has identified a narrow range of possible
values for γ. 11 From that range I choose γ = 0.8 and given that choice, I choose η
to match the share of physical capital in GDP.
The remaining parameters are chosen to match salient features of firm dynamics
and size distribution in the US. First, the amount of job creation and destruction at
the firm level is large. Second, large firms are relatively few in number, but account
for a disproportionately large share of total employment. For example, establish-
ments with 100 or more employees represent less than 3% of the total number of
establishments but account for 46% of total employment, and firms with 500 or more
employees represent only 0.4% of the total number of employer firms but account for
almost 50% of total employment. Finally, as made clear by Figure 1, most small firms
11See the discussion in Guner et al. (2008).
25
are single-establishment firms, while large firms typically operate multiple establish-
ments. Moreover, the average employment size of establishment is roughly constant
for those large firms. The model in this paper is qualitatively consistent with these
features, and model parameters are chosen to quantitatively match data moments
concerning these features.
The stock of intangible capital is a key determinant of firm employment sizes in
the model. As mentioned above, it evolves according to the following equation
xt+1 = [(1− δx)xt + xθ1t Iθ2t ] exp(t+1) (1.23)
where xt is the current stock of intangible capital and It is the investment in intangible
capital in period t . δx is the depreciation rate of intangible capital, θ1 determines
the importance of the current stock of intangible capital in the production of new
intangible capital, while θ2 determines the importance of investment It. t+1 is a
random shock whose value is realized at the beginning of period t+ 1. I assume t+1
is distributed according to a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation
σ.
I choose (θ1, θ2) to match some important moments of the firm employment size
distribution in the US, namely, mean firm employment size and employment share
of firms with more than 500 employees. I use the 2003 data. The results don’t
change substantially if I use the data from other years in recent decades, as firm size
distribution has been quite stable since 1970s in the US. As we see in Figure 3, the
model does a good job in matching the entire firm size distribution. The standard
deviation of shocks to intangible capital, σ, is chosen to match the average volatility
of firm employment growth rates (employment weighted, excluding firm entry and
exit) reported in Davis et al. (2007). The depreciation rate of intangible capital δx is
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Figure 1.3: Firm Size Distribution: Model and Data
chosen to be 10% per year. 12
As is made clear above, the parameter that determines the importance of tech-
nology capital in firm production, α, also determines the scale economies of multi-
establishment operations. Other things being equal, when α is larger, firms with a
larger stock of intangible capital x operate more but smaller establishments. In con-
trast, when the cost of operating additional establishments τe is larger, firms with a
12Empirical estimates of intangible capital depreciation rate are hard to come by. However, a
large part of intangible capital is generated through investment in R&D, and empirical studies on
R&D depreciation rate such as Schankerman and Pakes (1986) find the rate is above 10%. As a
robustness check, I also try other values for depreciation rate of intangible capital, and the main
results do not depend critically the choice of the depreciation rate.
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Figure 1.4: The Number of Establishments in Firms of Different Employment Sizes:
Model and Data
larger stock of intangible capital x operate fewer but larger establishments. There-
fore, I choose (α, τe) to match the average number of establishments owned by firms
in the US economy, and average employment size of establishments in firms with 500
or more employees.
The distribution of initial draws of intangible capital, φ(x), is assumed to be a
Pareto distribution with scale parameter xm and shape parameter a. The reason
behind this assumption is the size distribution of new firms is well approximated by
a Pareto distribution. I choose the shape parameter a to match the shape parameter
of the size distribution of new firms, and choose xm to match the mean employment
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Parameters Values
β discount factor 0.93
η importance of physical capital 0.40
δ depreciation rate of physical capital 0.14
γ span of control parameter 0.80
δx depreciation rate of intangible capital 0.10
α importance of technology capital in production 0.38
τe cost of operating an establishment 7.13
θ1 importance of current intangible capital 0.55
θ2 importance of intangible capital investment 0.24
σ volatility of shocks to intangible capital 0.22
a shape parameter of distribution of initial x 1.25
xm scale parameter of distribution of initial x 2.72
λ probability of firm death 0.08
τf firm entry cost 13.10
† This table shows calibrated parameters for the benchmark econ-
omy.
Table 1.1: Calibration: Parameter Values
size of new firms.
Finally, the probability of firm death shock, λ, is chosen to match the mean US
firm exit rate in 2003. The equilibrium wage in the benchmark economy is normalized
to 1, and firm entry cost τf is chosen so that the free-entry condition (1.21) is satisfied.
I summarize the parameter values and the targets in Tables (1) and (2).
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Targets Data Model
Physical capital to output ratio 2.33 2.34
Share of physical capital in output 0.32 0.31
Investment in physical capital 0.14 0.14
Mean firm size 22.6 22.5
Mean number of establishments per firm 1.27 1.25
Mean establishment size in firms w/ 500+ workers 53.9 53.8
Employment share of firms w/ 500+ workers 0.50 0.50
Firm exit rate 0.08 0.08
Mean size of new firms 5.8 5.9
Shape of size distribution of new firms 1.25 1.25
† This table shows the model and data moments used in calibration.
Table 1.2: Calibration: Model and Data Moments
1.5 Distortions
1.5.1 Size-Dependent Distortions
In this subsection, I use the calibrated model to evaluate the effects of firm-level
and establishment-level distortions. In the presence of multi-establishment firms,
these two types of distortions may produce different cross-section and aggregate ef-
fects.
Size-Dependent Distortions to Establishments
First, I study the cross-sectional and the aggregate effects of size-dependent distor-
tions to establishments, which are the focus of previous studies such as Guner et al.
(2008) and Restuccia and Rogerson (2008). I introduce the following taxes whose
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rates rise with establishment output to the benchmark economy: an establishment
with output y faces a tax rate 1 − κy−ρ, where 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. The parameter κ de-
termines the mean level of the taxes, while ρ determines the size dependency of the
taxes. When ρ = 0, all the establishments,small or large, face the same tax rate 1−κ.
In this case the tax scheme is size-independent. When ρ > 0, establishments with a
larger amount of output y face higher tax rates.
The static profit-maximization problem of a firm with intangible capital x now
becomes
pi(x) = max
n≥1,h,zf ,ze
κn[
(
zαf
(ze
n
)1−α)
1−γ
((
k
n
)η (
h
n
)1−η)
1−γ]1−ρ−wh−Rk−wτe(n−1)}
where zf + ze ≤ x.
There is a cutoff level x¯ such that firms intangible capital x < x¯ choose to operate
only one establishment, and for any x, x′ < x¯
h(x)
h(x′)
=
( x
x′
)
(1.24)
while firms with x ≥ x¯ choose to operate multiple establishments, and for any x, x′ > x¯
h(x)
h(x′)
=
( x
x′
) 1
1−α
(1.25)
h(x)
n(x)
= g(α, ρ)γτe (1.26)
where g(α, ρ) is decreasing in ρ.
Equation (1.26) implies that the size of establishments in multi-establishment
firms is decreasing in ρ: since establishments in multi-establishment firms have larger
output, after the introduction of taxes whose rates are higher for establishments
with larger output, those firms respond by operating a larger number of smaller
establishments. Therefore, size-dependent distortions at establishment level induce
multi-establishment firms to operate establishments of inefficiently smaller sizes. On
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Benchmark
Level (κ) 1 1 1 1 1
Size Dependency (ρ) 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
Statistics
Aggregate Output 100 97.2 94.5 91.9 89.3
Wage 100 90.6 82.7 76.2 70.6
Mean Firm Size 100 73.4 56.2 43.7 35.0
Mean Establishment Size 100 76.4 60.6 48.9 32.2
Total Number of Firms 100 136.2 177.9 228.9 285.3
Total Number of Establishments 100 130.9 165.0 204.6 310.5
Establishments Per Firm 100 96.0 92.5 89.6 87.0
Employment Share of Firms 500+ 50.0% 42.0% 35.3% 29.1% 23.0%
† This table shows the effects on displayed variables associated to establishment-
level size-dependent distortions across steady states. Column 2 reports the values
of displayed variables in the benchmark economy, most of which are normalized
to 100. Column 3-6 report the changes from increasing the size dependency of
distortions.
Table 1.3: Effects of Establishment-Level Size-Dependent Distortions
the other hand, Equations (1.24) and (1.25) imply that for a given distribution of
intangible capital x across firms, size-dependent distortions at establishment level may
not create much misallocation of capital and labor across firms; but since distortions
affect firm’s investment on intangible capital, they also affect the distribution of
intangible capital x across firms.
To evaluate the effects of establishment-level size-dependent distortions, I compute
stationary equilibria for κ = 1 and different levels of ρ: ρ = 0.02, 0.04, 0.06 and 0.08,
and summarize the results in Table (3). As we can see, size-dependent distortions at
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establishment level have a large impact on firm size distribution: mean firm size, mean
number of establishments per firm and the employment share of firms with more than
500 workers all decrease with ρ, and when ρ = 0.08, mean firm size is only a third
of that in the benchmark economy, while mean number of establishments per firm
drops by 13% and the employment share of firms with more than 500 workers drops
from 50% in the benchmark economy to 23%. On the other hand, the distortions
cause substantial losses to aggregate output: aggregate output decreases with ρ and
when ρ = 0.08, aggregate output drops by 11% compared with the benchmark case.
Notice, however, total tax revenue is not the same across these experiments.
Size-Dependent Distortions to Firms
I evaluate the effects of size-dependent distortions to firms, by introducing the fol-
lowing size-dependent output taxes to the benchmark economy: a firm with output
y faces a tax rate 1 − κy−ρ, where 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. The parameter ρ determines the size
dependency of the taxes while κ determines the level of the taxes.
Then the static profit-maximization problem of a firm with intangible capital x
becomes
pi(x) = max
n≥1,k,h
{κΩ[(nαx)1−γ(kηh1−η)γ]ρ − wh−Rk − wτe(n− 1)}
There is a cutoff level x˜ such that firms with intangible capital x < x˜ choose to
operate only one establishment, and for any x, x′ < x˜
h(x)
h(x′)
=
( x
x′
)d1(ρ)
(1.27)
while firms with x ≥ x˜ choose to operate multiple establishments, and any x, x′ > x˜
h(x)
h(x′)
=
( x
x′
)d2(ρ)
(1.28)
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Benchmark
Level (κ) 1 1 1 1 1
Size Dependency (ρ) 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
Statistics
Aggregate Output 100 97.7 94.5 91.4 88.7
Wage 100 87.5 79.3 73.2 68.2
Mean Firm Size 100 55.7 40.5 32.7 27.5
Mean Establishment Size 100 65.3 49.8 40.8 34.3
Total Number of Firms 100 179.5 246.9 305.8 363.6
Total Number of Establishments 100 153.1 200.8 245.1 291.5
Establishments Per Firm 100 84.8 81.6 80.4 80.0
Employment Share of Firms 500+ 50.0% 16.0% 4.2% 1.3% 0.4%
† This table shows the effects on displayed variables associated to firm-level size-
dependent distortions across steady states. Column 2 reports the values of dis-
played variables in the benchmark economy, most of which are normalized to
100. Column 3-6 report the changes from increasing the size dependency of
distortions.
Table 1.4: Effects of Firm-Level Size-Dependent Distortions
h(x)
n(x)
=
γ(1− η)
(1− γ)
τe
α
(1.29)
both d1(ρ) and d2(ρ) are decreasing in ρ. From Equation (1.27) and (1.28), for a
given distribution of intangible capital x, size-dependent distortions produce a more
compressed firm size distribution, while from Equation (1.29), the size of establish-
ments in multi-establishment firms is not affected by distortions. Hence, firm-level
size-dependent distortions induce firms with high x to use less labor and operate fewer
establishments, but not smaller establishments.
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To facilitate the comparison with the establishment-level size-dependent distor-
tions, I compute stationary equilibria for κ = 1 and ρ = 0.02, 0.04, 0.06 and 0.08, and
summarize the results in Table (4). Size-dependent distortions at firm level have an
even larger impact on the firm size distribution: for each value of ρ, the decrease in
mean firm size, mean number of establishments per firm and the employment share
of firms with more than 500 workers are larger than they were for the same distor-
tions at establishment level. For example when ρ = 0.08, mean firm size is only a
fourth (vs. a third with distortions at establishment level) of that in the benchmark
economy, while mean number of establishments per firm drops by 20% (vs. 13%) and
the employment share of firms with more than 500 workers drop from 50% in the
benchmark economy to 0.4% (vs. 23%). Nonetheless, the effects on aggregate output
are similar for these two forms of distortions. For example, when ρ = 0.08, aggregate
output drops by 11.3% (vs. 10.7%) compared with the benchmark case. Again, total
tax revenue is not the same across these experiments.
Size-Dependent Distortions under Revenue Neutrality
An important feature of the previous experiments is that the amount of resources
extracted via the distortions is not constant across them. To evaluate the quantitative
importance of total tax revenue, I redo the above experiments under the constraint
of revenue neutrality.
I start with establishment-level distortions with ρ = 0.02, and choose κ such that
the total amount of resources extracted is 10% of aggregate output in the new steady
state. For all the other distortions, choose κ such that the amount of resources ex-
tracted is the same as in the above case. I summarize the effects of establishment-level
size-dependent distortions in Table (5), and the effects of firm-level size-dependent
distortions in Table (6).
35
Benchmark
Level (κ) 1 0.97 1.033 1.09 1.14
Size Dependency (ρ) 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
Statistics
Aggregate Output 100 95.9 95.9 95.6 94.9
Wage 100 86.6 86.7 86.2 85.0
Mean Firm Size 100 73.4 56.2 43.7 35.0
Mean Establishment Size 100 76.4 60.6 48.9 32.2
Total Number of Firms 100 136.2 177.9 228.9 285.3
Total Number of Establishments 100 130.9 165.0 204.6 310.5
Establishments Per Firm 100 96.0 92.5 89.6 87.0
Employment Share of Firms 500+ 50.0% 42.0% 35.3% 29.1% 23.0%
† This table shows the effects on displayed variables associated to establishment-
level size-dependent distortions across steady states. Column 2 reports the values
of displayed variables in the benchmark economy, most of which are normalized
to 100. Column 3-6 report the changes from increasing the size dependency of
distortions. The amount of resources extracted via the distortions is the same in
Column 3-6.
Table 1.5: Effects of Establishment-Level Distortions: Revenue Neutrality
As we can see Table (5) and (6), these distortions have vastly different effects on
firm size distribution, but their effects on aggregate output do not differ much. Let’s
focus on establishment-level size-dependent distortions with ρ = 0.02 and ρ = 0.08.
When ρ = 0.02, compared with the benchmark economy, mean firm size drops by
26%, mean number of establishments per firm drops by 4% and the employment
share of firms with more than 500 workers drop to 42%; when ρ = 0.08, mean firm
size drops by 65%, mean number of establishments per firm drops by 13% and the
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Benchmark
Level (κ) 1 0.985 1.038 1.083 1.125
Size Dependency (ρ) 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
Statistics
Aggregate Output 100 97.0 96.2 94.9 93.5
Wage 100 85.6 83.7 82.0 80.6
Mean Firm Size 100 55.7 40.5 32.7 27.5
Mean Establishment Size 100 65.3 49.8 40.8 34.3
Total Number of Firms 100 179.5 246.9 305.8 363.6
Total Number of Establishments 100 153.1 200.8 245.1 291.5
Establishments Per Firm 100 84.8 81.6 80.4 80.0
Employment Share of Firms 500+ 50.0% 16.0% 4.2% 1.3% 0.4%
† This table shows the effects on displayed variables associated to firm-level size-
dependent distortions across steady states. Column 2 reports the values of dis-
played variables in the benchmark economy, most of which are normalized to
100. Column 3-6 report the changes from increasing the size dependency of dis-
tortions. The amount of resources extracted via the distortions is the same in
Column 3-6.
Table 1.6: Effects of Firm-Level Distortions: Revenue Neutrality
employment share of firms with more than 500 workers drop to 23%. However, their
effects on aggregate output are rather similar: when ρ = 0.02, aggregate output drops
by 5% relative to the benchmark case, and when ρ = 0.08, aggregate output drops
by 6%.
I also carry out another set of experiments to illustrate the quantitative impor-
tance of the amount of resources extracted via the distortions. For each size-dependent
distortion, I compute the effects of size-independent (purely proportional) distortion
37
that extracts the same amount of resources. I summarize the effects of size-dependent
and the corresponding size-independent distortions in Table (7). As we can see, size-
dependent and the corresponding size-independent distortions have very different ef-
fects on firm size distribution: unlike size-dependent distortions, size-independent
distortions have a very small impact on mean firm sizes, mean number of estab-
lishments per firm and the employment share of large firms. However, both types
of distortions have similar effects on aggregate output when they extract the same
amount of resources: no matter how large their effects on aggregate output are, the
difference in the reduction of aggregate output in these two cases is smaller than 1
percentage point.
This finding may have important implications for empirical studies on misallo-
cation. It suggests that contrary to what is commonly believed in the literature,
cross-country differences in firm size distributions or the correlation between distor-
tions and firm size or productivity do not tell us much about the distortionary effects
on aggregate productivity and output. In contrast, the amount of resources extracted
seems to be more informative of the aggregate effects of distortions.
1.5.2 Restrictions on Establishment Creation
In this subsection, I use the calibrated model to study restrictions on establish-
ment creation by multi-establishment firms. As mentioned above, there are policy
distortions that restrict the establishment creation by multi-establishment firms, such
as geographic restrictions on the US banking industry before the 1990s, which lim-
ited bank’s ability to choose branch locations, and the restrictions on the entry of
large international retail chains in India’s retail industry. Since it explicitly models
multi-establishment operations, my model is well suited to studying these restrictions.
In the benchmark economy, the cost of operating an additional establishment
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Benchmark
Level (κ) 1 1 0.927 1 0.870 1 0.826
Size Dependency (ρ) 0 0.02 0 0.04 0 0.06 0
Statistics
Aggregate Output 100 97.2 96.5 94.5 93.7 91.9 91.4
Wage 100 90.6 89.5 82.7 81.5 76.2 75.5
Mean Firm Size 100 73.4 99.9 56.2 99.6 43.7 99.7
Mean Establishment Size 100 76.4 99.8 60.6 99.4 48.9 99.5
Establishments Per Firm 100 96.0 100.1 92.5 100.2 89.6 100.2
Employment Share of Firms 500+ 50.0% 42.0% 49.6% 35.3% 49.6% 29.1% 49.6%
† This table shows the effects on displayed variables associated to size-dependent and size-
independent distortions at establishment level across steady states. Column 2 reports the
values of displayed variables in the benchmark economy, most of which are normalized to
100. Column 3, 5 and 7 report the effects associated to distortions with different degree of
size dependency, while Column 4, 6 and 8 report the effects associated to the corresponding
size-independent distortions that extract the same amount of resources.
Table 1.7: Effects of Establishment-Level Distortions: Size-Dependent vs. Size-
Independent
is τe unit of labor, which may capture the regulation of establishment entry, the
communication cost between headquarters and affiliate establishments and so forth.
Therefore, I model the restrictions on establishment creation as an increase in τe.
I study the effects of restrictions that apply to a small sector, in which case wage
w is determined exogenously and will not be affected by the restrictions, as well as
restrictions that apply to the whole economy, in which case wage w is determined
endogenously and will be affected by the restrictions.
Table (8) summarizes the cross-sectional and the aggregate effects of restrictions
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on establishment creation that raise τe by 100%. In both cases of fixed and endoge-
nous wages, restrictions on establishment creation have large effects on the firm size
distribution. The intuition is follows. As τe goes up, the cost of multi-establishment
operations increases, and multi-establishment firms choose to operate a smaller num-
ber of establishments with larger employment sizes. Meanwhile, the increase in τe
affects only multi-establishment firms, which are at the same time large firms, there-
fore both mean firm size and the share of large firms in the economy would decrease.
In the case of fixed wage, a 100% increase in τe causes a 40% decrease in mean firm
size and 17% decrease in the mean number of establishments per firm, and the em-
ployment share of firms with more than 500 employees drops from 50% to 28%. In
the case of endogenous wage, a 100% increase in τe causes a 24% decrease in mean
firm size and 15% decrease in the mean number of establishments per firm, and the
employment share of firms with more than 500 employees drops from 50% to 33%.
In contrast, restrictions on establishment creation have very different effects on
output in the two cases. In the case of fixed wage, total output in the sector where
the restrictions apply to would drop by 33% after τe rises by 100%. However, in the
case that restrictions apply to the whole economy and wage would affected by the
restrictions, the effect of restrictions on aggregate output is much smaller: aggregate
output only drops by 2% after τe rises by 100%. The reason is that, in the case of
endogenous wage, equilibrium wage drops after the introduction of restrictions, which
induces more firm entry. This in turn offsets the distortionary effects on aggregate
output. This result confirms the important insights from Atkeson and Burstein (2010)
in a different setting: firm entry plays an important role in offsetting the aggregate
effects of incumbent firm’s decisions.
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Benchmark Wage is fixed Wage is endogenous
τe doubles τe doubles
Statistics
Aggregate Output 100 62.7 97.7
Mean Firm Size 100 60.4 76.1
Mean Establishment Size 100 72.5 89.6
Total Number of Firms 100 100 131.4
Total Number of Establishments 100 83.3 111.6
Establishments Per Firm 100 83.2 84.7
Employment Share of Firms 500+ 50.0% 28.0% 32.8%
† This table shows the effects on displayed variables associated to restrictions on es-
tablishment creation across steady states. Column 2 reports the values of displayed
variables in the benchmark economy, most of which are normalized to 100. Column 3
reports the effects of restrictions on establishment creation when they apply to a small
sector and double the cost of operating an additional establishment τe, in which case
wage is fixed, and Column 4 reports the effects of restrictions when they apply to the
whole economy and double τe, in which case wage changes endogenously.
Table 1.8: Effects of Restrictions on Establishment Creation
1.5.3 Discussion of Results and Related Literature
This paper contributes to a growing literature on misallocation and productivity,
see Restuccia and Rogerson (2013) for a review of the recent literature. The most
closely related paper is Hopenhayn (2014), which establishes theoretically the map-
ping between distortions and aggregate productivity, and constructs an employment-
weighted measure of distortions. Contrary to what is commonly believed in the
literature, he finds size distributions may not be informative of effects on aggregate
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productivity, and distortions that are correlated with firm size or productivity are
not necessarily more damaging compared with other distortions.
My model extends the simple static framework in Hopenhayn (2014) along several
important dimensions, but the results in my paper confirm the important insights in
his paper. Moreover, the construction of the measure of distortions in Hopenhayn
(2014) requires the information on firm size distribution in the undistorted and dis-
torted economies, while the quantitative results in my paper suggest the amount of
resources extracted via the distortions may summarize the aggregate effects of dis-
tortions to a first-order approximation.
Atkeson and Burstein (2010) build a general equilibrium model in which firms’ de-
cisions respond to a change in trade costs, and they find the change in trade cost can
have large impact on firms’ decisions, but the impact is not important for aggregate
productivity. They emphasize the importance of firm entry (or product innovation),
which largely offsets the effects of incumbent firm’s decisions on aggregate productiv-
ity. This paper studies a different question, but the key results are similar in spirit:
distortions may have vastly different effects on individual firms’ decisions and firm
size distribution, but once we control for total tax revenue, their effects on aggregate
output are similar. And firm entry plays an important role in offsetting the aggregate
effects of incumbent firm’s decisions in this paper as well.
This paper is also related to studies on multi-national firms and foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) in the trade literature. Markusen (1984) builds an equilibrium model
of multi-national firms based on knowledge capital, i.e., intangible assets that have
a joint-input feature, which give rise to the economies of multi-plant operations; see
Markusen (1995) for a review of subsequent contributions to the literature. McGrat-
tan and Prescott (2009) incorporate technology capital into neoclassic growth model
and use it to quantify the gains from opening to FDI. Ramondo (2014) builds a multi-
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national firm model that combines Lucas (1978) with Eaton and Kortum (2002), and
use it to quantify the gains from opening to FDI.
Quantitative studies in the literature find large gains from opening to FDI, while
in a domestic setting, my paper finds relatively small losses to aggregate productivity
from restrictions on establishment creation. One possible explanation for the rela-
tively small losses is, labor is allowed to move freely in my model, while there are
severe restrictions on labor mobility across national boundaries in the trade literature.
In this sense, the losses from restrictions on establishment creation in this model can
be regarded as a lower bound, and it would be interesting to see how restrictions on
labor mobility would change the results.
1.6 Conclusions
I build a multi-establishment firm model and use it to study distortions that cause
misallocation among establishments and firms. I find that size-dependent distortions
to establishments and to firms have very different effects on firm size distribution, but
have similar effects on aggregate output. I also use the model to study restrictions
on establishment creation, and find they have large effects on output when applying
to a small sector, and small effects on aggregate output when applying to the whole
economy.
This paper focuses on the steady-state effects of misallocation. However, the
analytical framework of this paper can be extended to study important questions
regarding productivity growth. Unlike Europe, the US experienced a surge in pro-
ductivity growth in the 1990s. Meanwhile, important sectors such as the banking and
retail trade underwent a massive reallocation of resources from single-establishment
to multi-establishment firms. The model in this paper can be modified to study how
this massive reallocation and its interaction with information technology affect pro-
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ductivity growth. This should contribute to our understanding of the difference in
productivity growth between the US and Europe.
It would also be interesting to extend the model to multi-country settings, and
use it to understand the role of multi-national firms in global production and assess
the gains from openness to trade and foreign direct investment.
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Chapter 2
THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMS AND INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION
2.1 Introduction
Rapid economic growth in China has successfully pulled hundreds of millions of
people out of poverty in the last few decades. However, as both the pace of indus-
trialization and urbanization accelerate, the public has been increasingly concerned
with the environmental consequences of economic growth. 1 In recent years, ma-
jor metropolitan cities across the country suffered from atmospheric haze pollution.
A large number of people have been affected by frequent incidents of emergent and
cumulative water contamination. 2 As stated in the Report on the Work of the Gov-
ernment 2014, the Chinese government has vowed to undertake a campaign to fight
against environmental pollution. For this purpose, the State Council has allocated
almost $600 billion of special funds for controlling air and water pollution. 3 The
primary target of the campaign is to reduce industrial pollution. In order to provide
effective policy prescriptions, the key question is then what is the driving force behind
the heavy industrial pollution by Chinese manufacturing firms?
We show that firm size is an important factor in explaining the high industrial
pollution emission problem in China. There are two observations that motivate our
1For general surveys of the current situation of China’s environmental pollution see Vennemo
et al. (2009), Zheng and Kahn (2013) and the references therein. For media press coverage, see for
example the Symposium “Choking on growth — Examining the Impact of China’s Epic Pollution
Crisis” in The New York Times in late 2007.
2A wealth of literature has since investigated the causal relationship between pollution and various
aspects of human’s well-being. For health consequences of water pollution, see for example Economy
(2004), Ebenstein (2012), Zhang (2012), and Yang and Zhuang (2014). Graff Zivin and Neidell (2013)
provides an excellent survey of the related literature.
3The funds are CNY 1.6 trillion ($260 billion) under Air Pollution Prevention and Control Plan
and CNY 2 trillion ($320 billion) under Water Pollution Prevention and Control Plan.
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inquiry into firm size:
(i) Small firms have much higher pollution intensity (pollutants discharged per
unit of production) than large firms, indicating that firm size differences can
potentially have a large effect on measured aggregate industrial pollution. Us-
ing firm-level emission data on water pollution from the First National General
Survey of Pollution Sources, we find 7- to 32-fold differences in pollution inten-
sity between firms with total output in the top and bottom quartiles for the top
5 polluting industries in China. 4 Furthermore, we find that large firms pollute
less because they use production technologies that are more environmentally
friendly, and pollutant treatment technologies that are more advanced. Put dif-
ferently, large firms not only generate less pollutants, but also remove a larger
proportion of them from the discharged wastewater.
(ii) Small firms account for a larger fraction of production in manufacturing sectors
in China than in the U.S. Using data from the First China National Economic
Census and the Statistics of U.S Businesses, we document that for the top-5
polluting industries in China, firms with more than 400 employees account for
40% of the total employment, while for their American counterparts the number
is close to 70%. 5
We investigate the role of product market frictions in shaping the firm size dis-
tribution in China and subsequently assess quantitatively their impact on aggregate
industrial pollution and other macro aggregates, as well as their interaction with en-
4OLS regression indicates that as the total sales increase by 1%, the total emission increases by
0.62%. Studies using either data from other countries or from a selective group of Chinese firms
also point to the negative correlation between firm size and pollution intensity. See, for instance
Shapiro and Walker (2015) for the U.S; Dasgupta et al. (1998) for Brazil and Mexico; and Bloom
et al. (2010) for energy use in the UK.
5See Axtell (2001), Luttmer (2007) and Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007) for theories and
evidence regarding the heavy right tail of U.S. firm distribution.
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vironmental policies. We use wedges of average factor product to measure implicitly
the level of product market frictions [Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Restuccia and
Rogerson (2013)]. Examples of such product market frictions include local protec-
tionism and trade barriers which impede the inter-regional flow of goods, as well as
various administrative costs, etc. We find that product market frictions affect dispro-
portionately large productive firms, which limits the expansion of these productive
firms. Therefore, unproductive firms are allowed to survive, which results in output
loss. Since the adoption of advanced pollution treatment technology requires fixed
installation costs, product market frictions affect aggregate pollution via two chan-
nels. First, less firms are willing to install clean technologies because firms earn less
profits in a market with frictions. Second, firms using clean technologies account for
a smaller market share. As a result, output is lower and pollution level is higher.
To guide our analysis, we use a neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous
production units [the Lucas (1978) span-of-control model] featuring product market
frictions, imperfect environmental monitoring and endogenous pollution treatment
technology choice (clean and dirty). In our model, there is a stand-in representative
household with a continuum of members that are endowed with different managerial
talents. Household members make occupational choice decisions based on their talents
before entering the economy. A new feature of our model is that upon entering the
market, the entrepreneurs have to make decisions on which treatment technology
to install. In reality, there are two stages that firms can take actions to cut their
emission level. Firms can reduce the total quantity of pollutants generated during
the production stage by using environmentally friendly production technologies, or
reduce the end-of-pipe emission by adopting more advanced treatment equipments for
a given amount of pollutants generated. In this paper, we focus mainly on firm’s choice
of treatment technology. We capture the decrease of pollution intensity during the
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production stage in a reduced-form way, which is calibrated to data. The installation
of clean technology requires some fixed costs, however, firms with clean technology
will not be punished by the environmental agencies. The fixed costs associated with
clean technology lead to increasing returns to scale, which implies that in our model,
only large firms find it profitable to install clean technology. The optimal scale of
operation of a firm is determined by the managerial talent of the entrepreneur and
the frictions that the firm faces. Therefore, for a given distribution of managerial
talents and market frictions, the model generates endogenously the distributions of
firm sizes and employment, and that of the clean technology adoption.
To discipline our quantitative analysis, we require that our benchmark model with
product market frictions matches the firm size and employment distributions observed
in China. We then conduct two policy experiments: in the first one we eliminate the
product market frictions completely, while in the second we increase the regulation
such that the fraction of firms adopting clean treatment technology is the same as
in the first experiment. We subsequently calculate and compare measures of output,
consumption, productivity and aggregate pollution under the two policies.
Our quantitative results show that elimination of product market frictions in-
creases output by 30%, increases the fraction of firms using clean technology by 27%
and decreases pollution by 20%. The improvement in output is expected, since the
elimination of frictions allows the production resources to be allocated more efficiently
in the model. The drop in pollution comes from both the reduction in pollutants
generated during the production stage, and the increase in adoption rate of clean
treatment technologies at the treatment stage. Each stage contributes to about 50%
of the total reduction. The expansion of productive firms is key to both channels.
On the other hand, environmental policy which increases the expected punishment
reduces pollution by only about 10% and has very little effect on output. Moreover,
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we find that the environmental policy improves resource allocation on the extensive
margin by driving small unproductive firms out of the economy. However, the allo-
cation worsens at the intensive margin in the sense that among the remaining active
firms, the production of medium sized firms expands more at the expense of large
firms.
To assess quantitatively the importance of the size-dependency of these frictions,
we solve a version of the model where all firms in the economy face the same level
of frictions. In our model, the size-dependency of the frictions does not imply large
output loss. However, the size-dependency of the frictions assumes a central role in
determining the pollution level. This finding is consistent with Hopenhayn (2014).
The author shows that it is the total amount of resources that are affected that
determines the effects of the frictions as opposed to who is affected. Our results
complement his findings by demonstrating that while the size-dependency of the
frictions does not affect aggregate output by too much, its effect on the pollution
level is much larger.
Our findings call for a change in the policies that address the pollution problem
pairing urbanization and industrialization. The GDP-oriented promotion scheme in
China, under which whether a local government official is promoted depends on the
growth rate his/her governing region, has been identified as the source of industrial
pollution problem [Jia (2014)]. In this paper we emphasize on the roles of product
market frictions and firm size distribution. From a policy perspective, our results
suggest that a double-dividend where increase in the output and reduction in pollu-
tion are achieved simultaneously [Goulder (1994)] can be attained with policies that
target at reducing the economic frictions which prevent talented entrepreneurs from
operating their business at the scale that is necessary for the adoption of clean tech-
nologies. In fact, one implication of our results is that the GDP-oriented promotion
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scheme does not necessarily yield increased environmental pollution. In this way,
we view the insight provided in our paper as a complement to those in the political
economy literature.
Related Literature.—Our paper contributes to four strands of literature. First,
we contribute to a broad literature analyzing the environmental consequences of eco-
nomic activities. Modern discussions in this area are usually traced back to the
seminal work by Grossman and Krueger (1993, 1995) where the authors documented
an inverse U-shaped relationship between various metrics of pollution levels and out-
put per capita. This relationship, due to its resemblance of the famous Kuznets curve
[Kuznets (1955)], is thus referred to as the environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) in
subsequent literature. The international trade community has devoted considerable
efforts to studying the underlying economic mechanisms of the EKC. Copeland and
Taylor (2004) provide a thorough and complete survey of the early contributions.
Most of those studies focused on decomposing the pollution to the scale, technology
and industry composition effects using reduced-form methods. There is however, a
very recent growing literature on CO2 emissions in the trade community where het-
erogeneous firms models are involved theoretically [Barrows and Ollivier (2014) and
Shapiro and Walker (2015)]. We view our approach as complementary to that work.
In this paper, we build a macroeconomic model with rich quantitative implications
which facilitates the investigation of policy related questions. Our focus on the firm
size distribution and treatment technology adoption also distinguishes our paper from
that literature, which studies the roles of product mix, consumer preference, etc. In
connection with literature focusing on the cross-country comparison of firm size dis-
tributions [for example Poschke (2015)], our paper is also a candidate of structural
interpretations of the EKC.
Second, there is also a growing literature studying the causes of China’s industrial
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pollution. In accord with the views widely covered by the media, most these stud-
ies have identified political factors like the GDP-oriented promotion schemes [Wang
et al. (2008), Jia (2014)] and differential policy treatment to firms’ with different
ownership rights structures [Jiang et al. (2014)] as important factors that cause mas-
sive industrial pollutant discharge. In this paper, we argue that at the micro level,
the effects of economic frictions also play a major role. Political factors may act as
amplification of the effects of economic frictions, and vice versa. Policy prescriptions
aiming at reducing such economic frictions could potentially overcome the problems
of poor policy implementations and quick rebound that are constantly disturbing
policy makers. Another difference between our paper and these studies is that we
have access to a universal coverage database which contains information on directly
observed firm-level discharge of various pollutant.
Third, our paper is closely related to an important and growing literature on
the misallocation of resources across heterogeneous production units and its implica-
tions on macroeconomic aggregates. The early contributions are seminal work from
Hopenhayn (1992) and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). 6 Our paper relates par-
ticularly to Guner et al. (2008) and Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014) where the
role of size-dependent policies is examined. We contribute to this literature in two
ways. First, we provide empirical evidence on the potential role of product market
frictions in generating differences in size distributions between China and the U.S,
using the indirect approach by Hsieh and Klenow (2009, 2014). Second, we extend
the discussion of implications of size distribution on aggregate output and TFP to
aggregate pollution.
Lastly, our paper also connects to the literature on technology adoption in macroe-
6See Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), Guner et al. (2008), Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and
Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014) for recent discussions amongst others.
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conomics. The seminal work by Parente and Prescott (1994) introduces frictions in
technology adoption as a candidate for generating the cross-country productivity dif-
ference. A number of papers were dedicated to understanding technology diffusion
since then. This paper investigates in particular the role of product market frictions
and size distribution in impeding the adoption of clean production technology. On
this aspect, our paper inherits the intuitions from two early studies in economic his-
tory about tractors in the U.S—Clarke (1991) with the role of market frictions and
Olmstead and Rhode (2001) with the role of size distribution. We also view our study
as complementary to the paper by Acemoglu et al. (2012). There the authors analyze
the optimal policies to promote the advancing of clean production technology, while
our paper answers the related question of under what circumstances will these newly
invented technologies eventually be installed by firms.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section documents facts
pertaining to pollution intensity differences across firms and the comparison of firm-
size distributions between China and the U.S. We describe the model in Section 2
and calibrate its benchmark version in Section 3. In Section 4 we perform several
policy experiments to study the interaction between product market frictions and
environmental policies. We conclude in Section 5.
2.2 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we document the key empirical findings regarding the size-intensity
relationship and the comparison of size distributions between China and the U.S that
motivate our study. We start with a brief introduction of the data that we use. We
then move on to explain the empirical findings. Using an accounting exercise, in the
last section, we show that size distribution has a sizable effect on aggregate pollution.
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2.2.1 Data Sources
There are three major data sources that we draw upon in this paper: (i) the First
National General Survey of Pollution Sources, (ii) the First China National Economic
Census and (iii) the Statistics of U.S. Businesses. These three data sources are used
to calculate the pollution intensity of Chinese manufacturing firms and the size and
employment distributions of manufacturing firms in China and in the U.S. They are
referred to in the remainder of this paper respectively by their acronyms NGSPS,
CNEC and SUSB. 7
National General Survey of Pollution Sources.—The NGSPS is a joint effort of
multiple national ministries in China. The survey records data for year 2007. It is
designed to cover all entities and self-employed households which emit pollutants in
China. The complete survey consists of four components: industrial pollution sources,
agricultural pollution sources, domestic pollution sources and facilities for centralized
treatment of pollution. For the purpose of this paper, we use only information from
the industrial pollution sources. The variables we use are: the quantity of major pol-
lutant generated and discharged, the total value of production, the book value and
the annual operating costs of pollutant treatment equipments, the type of treatment
equipments, the firm’s industry (four-digit GB/T4574-2002), the ownership classifi-
cation, and the province. Specifically, the NGSPS contains information on discharges
of air and water pollutant and solid waste. Here we focus on water pollution because
the data are more accurately measured. However, we expect that the main results of
this paper could be applied to other pollution sources as well. The raw data contain
921,004 firms.
7In the interest of space, we leave more detailed description of these data, variables and sample
selections criteria to the online Appendix. The online appendix is currently under completion, results
are available upon request. Please address all correspondence to zjutangxin@gmail.com.
53
China National Economic Census.—The CNEC is conducted by the National
Bureau of Statistics (NBS, henceforth) in year 2004. It is designed to cover all legal
entities, industrial entities and privately-owned businesses which undertake economic
activities in secondary and tertiary industries in China. For our purpose we use
observations which belong to the manufacturing sector. The variables we use are: the
total value of production, the labor compensation, the book value of capital stock, the
number of employees, the firm’s industry (four-digit GB/T4574-2002), the ownership
classification, and the province. 8 The number of firms covered in NGSPS and
CNEC, 921,004 thousand and 1,375,148 million are broadly consistent given that
NGSPS further requires that a production entity to have pollution sources in order
to be included. 9
Statistics of U.S. Businesses.—The SUSB is conducted by the U.S Census Bureau
and is an annual series that provides national and subnational data on the distribution
of economic data by enterprise size and industry. It contains the number of firms and
total employment by sector (up to six-digit 2002 NAICS) and enterprise size groups
which we use.
2.2.2 Firm-level Pollution Intensity
Sample Selection.—It is well established in environmental science that industrial
waste is typically concentrated in a handful of sectors. Even within narrowly defined
8We emphasize here that it is important that we use the CNEC rather than the Annual Surveys
of Industrial Production for which data of year 2007 is available (the same year that the NGSPS
covers). The reason is that CNEC surveys firms of all sizes as opposed to only firms with a revenue
of more than CNY 5 million in the case of the annual surveys. In 2004, the number of firms and
employees covered by the annual survey are respectively 276,410 and 66,725,059 while those covered
in the census are 1,375,148 and 93,541,923. Therefore we would be missing 28.6% employment and
79.9% firms had we used only the annual survey. However, the basic features like variable definitions
are essentially the same in these two datasets. Therefore we would like to refer interested readers to
Brandt et al. (2012) which contains a detailed description of the annual surveys.
9More detailed comparisons on the statistical features of NGSPS and CNEC are available upon
requests.
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manufacturing sectors, pollutant emissions are usually concentrated among firms that
engage in some particular manufacturing processes. To address this issue, the NGSPS
divides the complete sample into two large groups—key sources and regular sources—
where firms identified as “key sources” are those that are most polluting. 10 We
focus on the key firms and use Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD, henceforth) as an
example in the main text. COD is the amount of oxygen consumed when a chemical
oxidant is added to a sample of water. It is an indirect measure indicating the overall
quantity of contaminants that will eventually cause oxygen loss and thus death of
living creatures. Table 2.1 lists the percentage of key and regular firms that have
positive emissions of different pollutants. We focus on key firms because the quality
of the data of these firms are higher, and most regular firms emit very little pollutants.
We choose COD because it allows us to keep most observations from the data. Other
pollutants are discharged by significantly less number of firms which raises sample
selection concerns. Moreover, COD emission is highly correlated with the emission
of other pollutants. 11 Finally, we focus on the measured end-of-pipe discharges
and present results for the top-5 polluting industries. Altogether, this leaves us with
29,019 firms.
Table 2.2 contains basic statistics about these industries. We see from it that the
key firms in the top-5 polluting industries are fairly representative of China’s indus-
trial pollution situation: in particular, these industries combined contribute to 77% of
the total industrial COD emission (Figure 2.1 provides a graphical illustration); the
key firms are responsible on average for more than 90% of the within sector emission
and for more than 80% of the within sector output.
10The Online Appendix contains a detailed description of the definition of the key sources.
11Take the Paper and Paper Product industry for example, the correlation between the emis-
sion of COD and that of NH+4 , corr(COD,NH
+
4 ) = 0.82, and that between COD and BOD,
corr(COD,BOD) = 0.94.
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Paper 33%
Agri 15%
Tex 14%
ChemMat 10%
Bever 4%
Others 23%
Figure 2.1: COD Emission by Sectors
Waste COD Petro NH+4 BOD CN Cr
6+ Phenol As Cr Total
Key 76.2 73.2 31.4 25.2 17.5 4.90 4.86 2.42 2.27 2.01 106,067
Reg 35.2 28.3 7.91 6.49 2.56 0.13 N/A 0.04 0.07 N/A 814,937
† Data Source: National General Survey of Pollution Sources. The acronyms are respectively
referring to: Wastewater, Chemical Oxygen Demand, Petrochemicals, Ammonian, Biochem-
ical Oxygen Demand, Cyanidium, Hexavalent Chromium, Volatile Phenols, Arsenium and
Chromium.
Table 2.1: Percentage of Firms with Positive Emission by Pollutants
Pollution Intensity and Firm Size.—We define pollution intensity per unit value
of production as
Intensity =
Total COD Emission
Total Value of Production
.
We group the firms into quartiles based on their total value of output. For each
industry, we calculate the output-weighted average of pollution intensity of the firms
in each quartile. Table 2.3 reports the results. For the Paper and Paper Product
industry, the pollutants emitted per unit of production by the firms in the bottom
quartile is 6.7 times of that by the firms in the top quartile. The difference can be as
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Paper Agri Tex Chem Bever Med Fer Petro Food Fib
Fraca 33.4 15.2 14.0 10.4 4.27 2.98 2.49 2.32 2.30 2.15
% Emib 99.6 91.8 91.1 99.7 65.1 92.9 99.9 99.9 96.4 97.8
% Proc 87.2 69.3 48.3 98.6 88.1 95.7 99.3 99.7 98.5 91.9
† Data Source: National General Survey of Pollution Sources. The acronyms are respec-
tively referring to (with two-digit GB/T4547-2002 classification code in the parenthe-
ses): Paper and Paper Products (C22); Processing of Food from Agricultural Products
(C13); Textile (C17); Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products (C26); Bever-
ages (C15); Medicines (C27); Mining, Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals (C32);
Processing of Petroleum, Coking, Processing of Nuclear Fuel (C25); Foods (C14);
Chemical Fibers (C28).
a Relative contribution to total COD emissions by sectors.
b Percentage of total COD emissions accounted for by key firms.
c Percentage of total production accounted for by key firms.
Table 2.2: Statistics of Top-10 Polluting Industries by COD
large as 31.4 times, as is the case of the Beverage Manufacturing industry. Moreover,
the pollution intensity decreases continuously as the size of the firm becomes larger.
This can also be seen from the scatter plot of the logarithm of intensity against that
of the total value of production. We plot the Paper and Paper Product industry
in Figure 2.2 for an example, scatter plots for the other four industries are left in
the Online Appendix. A significant negative correlation between log-intensity and
log-production in the data can be seen in Figure 2.2.
To further examine the statistical property of the relationship between intensity
and production level, we regress the log-emission on the log-sales, including a complete
set of dummies for two-digit industry (Xs), province (Xp), and ownership rights (Xo):
log(CODi) = −3.36
(0.37)
+ 0.62
(0.01)
× log(Salesi) + Xsγ1 + Xpγ2 + Xoγ3 + εi. (2.1)
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Figure 2.2: Pollution Intensity against Production
Source: National General Survey of Pollution Sources. Line: Least square fit.
The estimates are all statistical significant at 0.1% level with the standard errors
reported in the parentheses below the estimates. 12 The estimate implies that as the
total sales increases by 1%, the total emission increases by less than 1%, in particular
by 0.62% here. This suggests that the emission intensity is decreasing as the sales
of the firm increases. More specifically, by subtracting log(Salesi) on both sides of
Equation (2.1), the elasticity between pollution intensity and total sales is −0.38,
which means that other things equal, a 1% increase in the total sales is associated
with a 0.37% decrease in pollution intensity. The estimation has a R2 of 0.55, which
suggest that a fair amount of variation can be explained by variations in the total
12We have also estimated the relationship using other econometric specifications. For instance, we
estimated versions of Equation (2.1) for each industry, and with robust standard errors clustered on
different groups. All the regressions suggest the same negative relationship between intensity and
size qualitatively. The estimation results of the other specifications, as well as interpretations of the
coefficients before the dummies are included in the online Appendix.
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Quartile of Firm Sales
Industry QU1 QU2 QU3 QU4
Paper 6.7 3.2 2.0 1.0
Food Processing 20.8 7.6 3.6 1.0
Textile 8.3 3.6 2.4 1.0
Chemical Materials 6.7 3.8 2.7 1.0
Beverage 31.4 18.7 4.7 1.0
† Data Source: National General Survey of Pollution Sources. QU1 to QU4 rep-
resent respectively the bottom to the top quartile. The pollution intensity of
the top quartile of each industry is normalized to one.
Table 2.3: Pollution Intensity and Production Level
sales and in the three sets of dummies.
2.2.3 Firm Size and Treatment Technologies
The negative size-intensity relationship we document in Section II.B does not
explain why larger firms pollute with less intensity. To answer this question, we ex-
ploit the detailed information in the NGSPS on the end-of-pipe wastewater treatment
equipment that firms use. The NGSPS groups wastewater treatment technologies in
five categories: physical, chemical, physio-chemical, biological and combined tech-
nologies. In the subsequent analysis, we drop physio-chemical technologies because
less than 0.5% firms adopt this type of equipments. The combined technologies are
different combinations of biological technology with other technologies. They demon-
strate very similar features as biological technologies. We therefore group them with
biological technologies. Several examples of the actual technologies attributed to the
three base categories (physical, chemical and biological) are provided below:
(i) Physical: Filtering, Centrifuging, Precipitation Separation, etc.
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Technology 25% Median 75% Mean Adoption Rates
Physical 39.54% 77.81% 87.83% 63.37% 25.79%
Chemical 74.96% 81.29% 86.78% 69.77% 34.50%
Biological 78.87% 86.77% 91.27% 80.90% 39.71%
† Note: The numbers reported are for the Paper and Paper Product (C22) indus-
try. Treatment Efficiencies is defined as 1− COD Emitted/COD Generated.
Table 2.4: Treatment Efficiencies and Adoption Rates
(ii) Chemical: Oxidation-reduction, neutralization, etc.
(iii) Biological: Aerobic Biological Treatment, Activated Sludge Process, etc.
We are interested in the following features of these technologies: processing ef-
ficiency, designed processing capacity and installation costs. 13 To control for
potential heterogeneities in production processes across different industries, we use
the Paper and Paper Product industry (C22) as an example. 14 We proxy the
processing efficiency using one minus the ratio of emitted COD to generated COD.
Table 2.4 shows the quartiles of processing efficiencies and percentage of firms adopt-
ing each type of technology. The designed processing capacity (in tons) and actual
installation costs (in 2007 CNY) that are needed for the equipment to function prop-
erly can be retrieved directly from the data. We calculate the unit capacity cost (or
average cost of capacity) by dividing the installation cost by capacity. In Figure 2.3,
in clockwise order we plot the density functions of processing capacity, installation
13We do not include the annual operating costs in our analysis because on average, the ratio
of operating costs of the treatment equipments on the annual value of production is about 1.5%.
Furthermore, the median of this ratio is less than 0.5%, suggesting that operating costs are almost
negligible for more than 50% of the firms. Therefore, the operating costs alone is unlikely to affect
firm’s treatment technology adoption decision. Adding the operating costs to the installation costs
will not change the results.
14Pooling all polluting industries together yields very similar results and are hence left in the
Online Appendix.
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costs, total value of industrial output and unit capacity cost by technology type.
For all panels, log-scale is used in the horizontal axes. Broadly speaking, biologi-
0 5 10
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
0.
25
Processing Capacity
Capacity
D
en
si
ty
Phy
Chem
Bio
−2 0 2 4 6 8 10
0.
00
0.
10
0.
20
0.
30
Costs
Costs
D
en
si
ty
Phy
Chem
Bio
−5 0 5 10
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
Unit Capacity Cost
Unit−cost
D
en
si
ty
Phy
Chem
Bio
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
Production Scale
Production
D
en
si
ty
Phy
Chem
Bio
Figure 2.3: Technical Features of Different Treatment Technologies
Source: National General Survey of Pollution Sources. In all panels, the horizontal axes are in
log-scale.
cal technologies have the best processing efficiency, the largest processing capacity,
the highest installation costs but the lowest unit capacity cost. More specifically,
the mean (median) processing efficiency of biological technology is 17% (10%) higher
than the physical technology. The evidence points to a fixed costs type of mechanism
behind the less pollution intensity by large firms. In particular, although biological
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technologies are more advanced in terms of processing capacity and efficiency, they
are also more costly. Combined with the lower unit capacity cost that is displayed by
the biological technology, the evidence can be rationalized by the existence of a fixed
cost, which works essentially in the same way as the decreasing average cost when a
fixed cost is involved. Such a modeling strategy will imply that small firms lack the
profit margins that are needed to take advantage of the returns to scale exhibited by
biological technologies, while at the same time, large firms are more likely to adopt
these more advanced technologies.
Notice that the above results are all about the end-of-pipe treatment technologies,
and we have made no statement about factors that could lead to less COD generated.
In fact, in the data the COD generated per unit of production is also decreasing
in total value of output. It is possible that more productive technologies are also
more energy-efficient and environmentally friendly. An example from the Handbook
of Emission Coefficients by the Chinese Academy of Sciences is as follows. Two
technologies in paper pulp manufacturing use different inputs: bagasse and wood.
While bagasse is used mostly by firms with annual production of less than 100 k-tons
and with COD generation of 140-180 kg per ton, wood is used mostly by firms with
annual production more than 100 k-tons and with COD generation of 30-55 kg per
ton. Another example is from Bloom et al. (2010). The paper uses data of more
than 300 manufacturing firms in UK and finds that better management practices
are associated with both improved productivity and lower greenhouse gas emissions.
In this paper, we focus on firms’ decisions on treatment equipment adoption, and
modeled the intensity reduction during the production stage exogenously.
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2.2.4 Firm-Size Distributions
The negative correlation between pollution intensity and production scale implies
that, ceteris paribus the relative contribution to total output by large and small firms
could significantly affect the industrial pollution at the aggregate level. Therefore,
for our purpose, it is pivotal to understand the industrial structure—the number, size
and employment of firms—in China. To gauge our comparison, we look at size and
employment data in the U.S as a yardstick. We choose the U.S to be a benchmark of
the comparison for two reasons. First, it is generally agreed among macroeconomists
that among all the economies in the world, the U.S economy is perhaps the closest
counterpart to an undistorted market economy. Firms in many European countries
are subject to various labor market restrictions and hence their distributional prop-
erties are less likely to be representative of a frictions-free benchmark. Second, China
and U.S are both large economies with complete sets of industrial sectors. For dis-
aggregated studies like ours, it is important that we find comparable counterparts in
the benchmark country. Contrasting the industries in China with those in European
advanced economies, it would be problematic to find comparable counterparts, or the
corresponding industries are of significantly smaller production scale on aggregate.
The distribution of employment by firms of different sizes is the closest related
concept to our analysis. Ultimately, what is crucial to the quantity of pollutants
discharged is how much production is produced by small and large firms respectively,
not how many of them there are in the economy. Employment is a good proxy for
production share because it has been firmly established that labor compensation is
strongly correlated with total production. Nevertheless, we provide evidence on both
the size (the size distribution according to the number of firms) and employment
(the size distribution according to employment shares) distributions in this section,
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in order to allow for comparisons with existing studies. We use the International
Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities, Rev.3.1 (ISIC Rev 3.1)
published by the United Nations to bridge different industrial classification systems
adopted by China (GB/T4574-2002) and the U.S (NAICS 2002). More specifically,
crosswalks of GB/2002 at four-digit level and those of NAICS/2002 at six-digit level
are issued by China’s NBS and the U.S Census Bureau. The results presented in this
section are from matching at the disaggregated level (four-digit GB with six-digit
NAICS). 15
The SUSB organizes data according to enterprise size group rather than firm or es-
tablishment size which relates closer to what we want. In particular, for each size bin,
the SUSB reports the total number of firms, establishments and employees summed
up across all enterprises that fall in that size bin. We cannot use the size and share
distribution of the enterprises because according to the definition in SUSB, a large
enterprise could consist of firms and establishments in different locations, of different
sizes and even in different sectors. However, the number of firms includes only those
firms that are categorized as belonging to one particular industry. Therefore, we ap-
proximate the firm size distribution using the average firm size of a particular size
group, which is calculated by dividing the total employment by the number of firms.
We then assign groups of firms to different size bins according to their average size.
Such imputation introduces approximation errors in a complex way. 16 However, we
argue that most approximation errors lie in the upper tail of the distribution since
it is less common for enterprises with less than 200 employees to have multiple firms
15Those from matching at a more aggregated level (two-digit GB with three-digit NAICS) yields
very similar results
16Nevertheless, it is reassuring that the size and employment distribution calculated from the year
2000 data used in Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007), which is constructed from Census’ micro-data
(as opposed to imputed from the aggregated data here), give very similar results. These results can
be found in the Online Appendix.
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Figure 2.4: Employment Distribution
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Figure 2.5: Firm Size Distribution
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or establishments. To further reduce the approximation noise, we group the size bins
into four main groups: 1–19, 20–99, 100–399 and 400+. We drop firms with less than
19 employees when plotting the size distribution because we think many of them may
not be engaged in the actual production process but will significantly change the
shape of the size distribution. Including or dropping these firms does not change the
employment distribution because the calculation is essentially a weighted average with
the number of employees as the weight. These small firms are thus weighted much
less than the large ones. However, the firm size distributions are affected because of
the sheer amount of these firms. 17
The employment distributions for each of the top polluting industries and all
industries pooled together are shown in Figure 2.4. Similarly, those of the firm size
distributions are contained in Figure 2.5.
For all panels in Figure 2.4, we see that the share of employment of firms with more
than 400 employees in the U.S is significantly higher than the one in China. More
specifically, for the paper manufacturing industry, more than 90% of the workers in
the U.S are hired by firms with more than 400 employees while in China, the number
is less than 40%. Overall, looking at these industries together, approximately 70%
employment is in the large firms in the U.S while in China the number is only 20%. 18
These features of the data are consistent with Wang and Whalley (2014) where the
authors compare the manufacturing concentration ratio (the share of market occupied
by the largest firms) between China and the U.S. According to Table 1 in their paper,
17We choose not to use establishment as the unit of our analysis because more noise is likely
to be introduced by the approximation procedure that we adopt. However, results regarding the
employment distributions, which are our ultimate interest here, is quite robust across variations.
What is less robust is the firm size distribution, which is less relevant to our conclusions. All results
along with robustness checks with different size bin cut-offs are available upon request.
18The contrast is less stark in Figure 2.5, where firm size distributions are presented. For the
most polluting industry—the Paper and Paper Product Industry—the difference is still evident with
around 40% of the U.S firms with more than 400 employees, but less than 10% of those in China.
But the pattern is less pronounced for other industries and all polluting industries combined.
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the ratios of the concentration indicators of U.S over China for all five top polluting
industries are higher than the overall average.
These findings indicate that compared to the U.S, a much larger portion of pro-
duction is done by small firms in China. Hence the underlying industry structure
difference could be a candidate for explaining the high industrial pollution emissions
in China.
2.2.5 Size Distribution and Aggregate Pollution
To gain an understanding of the size of the quantitative effect of employment
distribution on aggregate pollution, in this section we conduct an accounting exercise.
In this exercise, for each polluting industry in China, we fix the level of total industrial
production, but replace the employment distribution (which we use as a proxy for
production share distribution) with that from the U.S and calculate the subsequent
implied level of aggregate industrial pollution. This simple exercise is complicated by
the fact that NGSPS only reports the firm-level total value of production but not the
number of employees. We use CNEC to overcome this issue. There are many ways to
construct the employment-production relationship using CNEC and each method has
its own advantages and disadvantages. In this section, we report results where the
employment-production relationship is constructed by linear regression. We provide
the details of the calculation and results of two alternative estimation methods in
Appendix A.
The results are shown in Table 2.5. The numbers reported are the ratio of the
aggregate pollution level produced with the U.S employment share distribution over
that with the original Chinese distribution.
The results imply that by changing the employment share distribution to that of
the U.S, while keeping production at the same level, the aggregate discharge in the
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Paper Agricultural Food Textile Chemistry Beverage Average Reduction
Average Intensity 43.5% 61.1% 97.5% 101.2% 89.0% 67.0% 25.5%
† Note: Please see notes of Table 2.2 for acronyms of industries. For individual industries, the numbers
reported are the aggregate pollution from the artificial U.S production structure as percentage from that of
China. Column 6 (Ave) calculates the weighted average of these ratios using the percentage contribution
in row one of Table 2.2 as weights. Column 7 (Reduc) reports the aggregate reduction, which is simply
the average without normalization.
Table 2.5: Size Distribution on Pollution
Paper and Paper Product industry reduces to 43.5% of the original level. The size
of such reductions decreases as the overall contributions (i.e., row one in Table 2.2)
decrease. The scale of the reduction for each industry is broadly proportional to the
industry’s contribution to the aggregate pollution. On average, for the top-5 polluting
industries, the effect of change in size distribution is reduction of discharge to 67% of
the original level. Changing the size distributions of the five industries together will
achieve a reduction in total discharge by about 25.5%. Although the exercise here
is a crude approximation, it nevertheless shows that size distribution could have a
significant impact on the level of aggregate industrial pollution.
2.3 The Model
The accounting exercise in the last section has several limitations. First, the
aggregate output is fixed. It is possible that when the size distribution changes,
although the pollution intensity decreases, but because of a larger increase in the
aggregate output, the aggregate pollution increases as a result. We would like to
allow for such a scenario in our analysis. Second, the employment distribution is
mechanically changed to that in the U.S. From the accounting exercise alone, we
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do not know what are the factors that drive the difference between the employment
distribution of China and the one of the U.S, nor do we know that by changing these
factors, whether the implied employment distribution will in fact become that of the
U.S. Third, the firm size and emission intensity relationship is taken as exogenous
and invariant. It is possible that changes in the factors that affect the employment
distribution also affects the technology choice decisions of the firms, which makes the
size-intensity relationship endogenous.
Therefore, to better evaluate the environmental consequences of distortions to
firm size, we need a model (i) in which some economic factors affect both aggregate
output and pollution; (ii) which reveals what are the factors that affect firm size and
how; and (iii) which provides explanation to the size-intensity relationship.
For this purpose, we consider a one sector neoclassical growth model with hetero-
geneous production units featuring product market frictions, imperfect environmental
monitoring and endogenous treatment technology choice. There is a stand-in repre-
sentative household with a continuum of members in the economy. Each period
household members make occupational choices on whether to work as a wage-earner
or to become an entrepreneur based on their comparative advantages. We assume
there are two types of treatment technologies—dirty and clean. An entrepreneur has
to choose between the two upon starting business. The two technologies could be
interpreted as the physical and biological technology we discussed in Section II.C.
We use physical/dirty and biological/clean interchangeably in the rest of the paper.
The environmental regulator imperfectly monitors the installation of clean technology
which requires fixed installation costs. If a firm is inspected and is found to be using
dirty technology, it receives a penalty.
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2.3.1 Setup
Household.—There is a representative household with a continuum of members.
Each household member is endowed with z units of managerial talent, z ∼ G(z) with
support Z , [0, z], where G(z) is the cumulative density and g(z) is the probability
density. We assume the support and distribution of z are exogenous. Further we
assume that z is fixed once drawn. Household members face an occupational choice
decision between worker and entrepreneur. A worker supplies one unit of labor in-
elastically in exchange for wage income and an entrepreneur rents capital and labor
to run a neoclassical firm and earns profits. Let the final product be the numeraire,
and R and W be the capital and labor rental price respectively. Firms and capital
are owned by the household.
Firms.—Firms combine managerial talent z, capital k and labor n to produce
output y according to technology
y = F (z, k, n) = z1−γ(kαn1−α)γ,
where γ < 1 is the span-of-control parameter. The assumption of decreasing returns
to scale with respect to k and n supports a non-degenerate distribution of firms. 19
The production process generates pollutants e as by-products. The total emission
depends on the production scale y and the treatment technology firms use
e = E(i, y), (2.2)
where i = 1 indicates the adoption of clean technology and i = 0 otherwise. The
installation of the clean equipment incurs fixed cost RkE, where we assume that the
19We build our model based on Lucas (1978) here. However, all the qualitative properties of our
model remain valid if instead we use a model with monopolistic competition [e.g., Melitz (2003)]
since the two models are isomorphic [see Appendix I of Hsieh and Klenow (2009)]. In the Melitz
model, the decreasing returns to scale come from the concavity in the utility function.
71
equipment is also rented from the market, just as the production capital k. The
benefit associated with the equipment is that firms will not be subject to potential
penalties from the regulating agency for using dated treatment technologies. 20
Regulators.—We assume that the environmental authority monitors the adop-
tion of clean technology by firms with probability p. When a firm that uses dirty
production technology gets caught, we assume that a fraction ξ of its total profits
is confiscated by the regulating agency. The confiscated profits are distributed to
the household as lump-sum transfers so they do not affect the decision problem of
household members. This reduced-form way of modeling monitoring policy could for
instance be rationalized by a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium of a behind-the-scenes
“monitoring game.”
The current industrial pollution management and control framework in China
consists of economic incentives and command-and-control instruments. 21 The pol-
lution levy system is the most widely used economic instrument in China. However,
it has been widely documented that it places very limited constraints on the pollution
emission of the firms because the penalty imposed is very low. Firms only have to pay
for the pollutant discharges that go beyond the national standard. The pollutant dis-
charges are self-reported and the truthfulness of the reported discharges is imperfectly
examined by the regulators. Further, for firms that discharge multiple pollutants and
more than one of the pollutants discharged are above the national standards, firms
only have to pay for the one that leads to the highest penalty. We calculate from the
CNEC the pollution fees levied on firms as a fraction of total value of output and
labor compensation. We find that for firms with strictly positive emission fees, these
20We choose to model the installation costs as one-time fixed cost as opposed to fixed cost plus
operating cost, or size-dependent fixed cost because the latter two are not supported by empirical
evidence. We also assume that the fixed cost is only associated with clean technology. See Section
A of the Online Appendix for further details.
21See Chapter 5 of World Bank (2001) for a detailed description.
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fees only account for 0.06% (median) and 0.3% (mean) of the labor compensation.
Therefore in practice, the environmental agencies rely mostly on the command-
and-control instruments. To implement the regulation, field inspections are done
by the staff of local environmental agencies. At the firm level, field staff typically
check the type of treatment equipment firms installed and test emission intensity
of major pollutants. Firms that are found at fault during the field inspection are
usually suspended from production for an extended period of time until the issues are
resolved. In cases of serious pollution accidents, criminal charges are imposed on the
owner of the firm. 22 In our model, the fraction ξ of the profits confiscated is used to
approximate these situations. Since according to Table 2.4, the treatment technology
used by firms is highly correlated with the pollution intensity, we assume that the
regulator in our model checks only the treatment technologies. Although the local
environmental agencies also monitor the total amount of discharges, these regulations
are usually done at more aggregated level, in most cases based on the provincial-level
aggregation. They thus are less relevant to the firm-level decision that we study here.
23
2.3.2 Product Market Frictions
Chinese firms face large frictions on both the product market and factor markets,
and these frictions could have sizeable effects on the size and employment distributions
22See Dasgupta et al. (2001) for a case study of Zhenjiang.
23Firm level inspections in the U.S are also targeted mainly on the adopted treatment technologies.
For example, as is stated in the 1977 Amendment of the Clean Air Act, each July every county in the
U.S will be classified as either an attainment or a non-attainment county according to their overall
pollutants emissions level. Firms in non-attainment counties are subject to substantially stronger
environmental regulations. For instance, newly established firms in these counties are required to
meet the standard of Lowest Achievable Emission Rate (LAER) which demands the installation
of the cleanest possible technology supposedly regardless of costs. While on the other hand, in
attainment counties only Best Available Control Technology (BACT) which incorporates cost con-
siderations is required. Similarly, existing firms are also subject to stricter regulations on production
and end-of-pipe treatment technologies in non-attainment counties than in the attainment counties.
See Becker and Henderson (2000) and the references therein for more details.
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of firms as well as other macro aggregates. 24 In this section, we provide evidence
on the identification of these frictions and subsequently our modeling choice of the
prevailing market frictions.
We follow Hsieh and Klenow (2014) by inferring factor and product market fric-
tions from the average factor products. Standard results of Cobb-Douglas production
function implies that the ratio of average factor products over marginal factor prod-
ucts is constant. Therefore, the average factor products also provide information
regarding the marginal factor products. 25 In particular, if we let τzi , τki and τli
be respectively the wedges firms face on the product, capital and labor market, the
profit maximization problem of firm i is
pii = max
ki,li
{
(1− τzi)z1−γi (kαi l1−αi )γ − (1 + τki)Rki − (1 + τli)Wli
}
.
Using the first order conditions, the average product of capital φk, labor φl and the
capital-labor ratio κ could be expressed as
φk =
y
k
=
(1 + τki)R
αγ(1− τzi)
, (2.3)
φl =
y
l
=
(1 + τli)W
(1− α)γ(1− τzi)
, (2.4)
κ =
k
l
=
α
1− α ·
(1 + τli)W
(1 + τki)R
. (2.5)
The above equations show that in absence of any market friction (τz = τk = τl = 0),
φk, φl and κ should be equalized across all firms. Equations (2.3) and (2.4) say that
firms that face higher capital (labor) and/or product market frictions will demonstrate
higher average product of capital (labor). In addition, according to equation (2.5), the
24For studies of frictions that Chinese firms face, see Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Brandt et al.
(2013), Song and Wu (2015), and Tombe and Zhu (2015). Recent studies that focus on the effect of
size and employment distributions on macro aggregates include Guner et al. (2008), Restuccia and
Rogerson (2008), and Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014) among others.
25In particular, using the notations later in this section, we can verify that ∂y/∂k =
αγz1−γkαγ−1l(1−α)γ = αγ(y/k). Similarly, we can show that ∂y/∂k = (1− α)γ(y/l).
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Figure 2.6: Factor and Product Market Frictions
Source: China National Economic Census. All panels are plot in log scale. Lines are least square
fit.
capital-labor ratio increases with the relative size of labor to capital market wedge.
Using firm-level data on total value of production, book value of capital stock and
labor compensation from the CNEC, we calculate z, φk, φl and κ for each firm in
our sample. Figure 2.6 shows in log scale the scatter-plots of φk, φl and κ against
firm-level productivity z for the Paper industry.
Two patterns can be observed from Figure 2.6. First, from the two upper panels,
we see that both φk and φl are positively correlated with z, which shows that more
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productive firms have higher average product of both capital and labor. Expressed
in wedges, this means both (1 + τk)/(1 − τz) and (1 + τl)/(1 − τz) are higher for
more productive firms. It could be because more productive firms are subject to
higher capital or product market frictions or both. Second, from the lower panel, we
see that the capital-labor ratio is at best weakly negatively correlated with z. The
least squares estimate of the elasticity is −0.0057 and the R2 is only 0.053. This
indicates that the relative wedge firms face on the capital and labor markets do not
depend strongly on the idiosyncratic productivity of firms, which in the context of our
model implies 1 + τk ≈ 1 + τl. Since we cannot separately identify the three wedges,
for simplicity, we assume τk = τl = 0 and attribute all the changes in the average
product of factors to wedges in the product market τz.
26 Different assumptions on
the distribution of frictions across the three markets will not affect our results, but
the interpretations need to be changed accordingly. 27
In the spirit of Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Adamopoulos and Restuccia
(2014), we implement these idiosyncratic wedges in the model by positing a generic
“tax” function that specifies the wedges as a function of firm’s productivity z:
τz = max
{
0, 1− φ0zφ1
}
. (2.6)
We assume the taxes collected are returned to household as lump-sum transfers. An-
ticipating the benchmark calibration in the next section, the wedge function specified
in equation (2.6) is increasing and concave in z, with the lower and upper bounds
being 0 and 1 respectively. The shape of the function captures the size-dependency
26For example, we cannot distinguish between the data generating process we use here and another
process where τk and τl increase simultaneously while τy is equal to zero.
27We cannot rule out the possibility that the results are driven by measurement error. However,
we argue that this does not seem to be the case here. In particular, if y is measured with extreme
measurement error, the regression coefficient of φk over z will be 1 − γ. Similarly, if instead k is
measured with extreme measurement error, the regression coefficient will be (1−γ)/γ. We calculate
φk and z using different values of γ and the regression coefficients do not vary as predicted by either
case.
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of the product market frictions where the wedges are higher for larger firms.
There is one difference between (2.6) and the tax function used by Adamopoulos
and Restuccia (2014). To model the size dependency, in their specification, the au-
thors use an exponential function as opposed to the power function here. We choose
the power function because it is consistent with the log-linearity of φk (φl) and z
while the exponential function implies a tax scheme that increases much sharper with
respect to productivity than the empirical counterpart.
The idiosyncratic τz is meant to capture a variety of policies and institutions
affecting the profits and, subsequently, the size of the firm. For example, it could be
that more productive firms face transportation costs [Adamopoulos (2011)] or local
protectionism and trade barriers that impede the inter-regional flow of goods [Young
(2000)] when attempting to deliver their products to wider range of areas. It could be
that smaller firms are subject to preferential tax treatment. For instance, the value
added taxes for firms with annual value of industrial output that is less than CNY 1
million is 3% while firms with production scale larger than CNY 1 million are subject
to a 13% tax rate. It is also consistent with a large amount of anecdotal evidence
where Chinese entrepreneurs complain about higher administrative costs associated
with increasing production scale. 28 Finally, in the language of the trade community,
τz could also be interpreted as different markups. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) show
that a linear demand yields a demand elasticity that is decreasing in firm size, which
subsequently translates into markups that increase with firm size. 29
In summary, the purpose of τz is to capture the empirical regularities in Figure
28For example, data from the World Bank Investment Climate Survey which surveys a representa-
tive sample (12,000 firms) of China’s manufacturing and service firms, report that 12% of the survey
respondents named “Anti-competition behaviors by local governments and other enterprises” as the
factor that is most damaging to the operation and growth of their firms.
29For the markup interpretation, we have to write a monopolistic competition version of our model
[Melitz (2003)], instead of the Lucas model we use here.
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2.6 in a parsimonious way. We do not intend to evaluate the role of any particular
observable product or factor market frictions. In this sense, methodologically we are
following the indirect approach as opposed to the direct approach [Restuccia and
Rogerson (2013)].
2.3.3 Firm’s Problem
Entrepreneurs first decide on which type of treatment technology to use and then
on how much to produce. The business profits of a type-z entrepreneur pi(z) is the
maximum over the profits of producing using dirty technology pi0(z) and those of
using clean technology pi1(z):
pi(z) = max
i∈{0,1}
{pi0(z), pi1(z)} , (2.7)
where i(z) is the treatment equipment choice decision.
Firms using clean technology are not subject to environmental penalties, hence
their profits are just revenues less costs:
pi1(z) = max
k,n
{
(1− τz)z1−γ(kαn1−α)γ −Wn−R(k + kE)
}
. (2.8)
Notice that here the treatment equipment kE cannot be used to produce the final
product. This is consistent with the empirical finding by Shadbegian and Gray (2005).
On the other hand, firms using dirty technology will be inspected by the environ-
mental authority with probability p. Under such circumstances, a fraction ξ of their
annual profits will be confiscated. Hence, the profit function is
piC0 (z) = (1− ξ)
[
(1− τz)z1−γ(kαn1−α)γ −Wn−Rk
]
,
where the superscript C indicates “caught.” While if the firm succeeds in evading
the inspection, the profit function is
piE0 (z) = (1− τz)z1−γ(kαn1−α)γ −Wn−Rk,
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where the superscript E indicates “evaded.” Because we assume perfect risk sharing
within the household, these entrepreneurs will not have precautionary motives and
will simply maximize the expected profits over piC0 and pi
E
0 :
pi0(z) = max
k,n
{
(1− p)piE0 (z) + ppiC0 (z)
}
.
Straightforward algebra yields
pi0(z) = max
k,n
{
(1− pξ) [(1− τz)z1−γ(kαn1−α)γ −Wn−Rk]} . (2.9)
2.3.4 Product Market Frictions and Technology Adoption
To clarify the basic mechanics of the model, in this section we analyze firms’
optimization problem in a partial equilibrium, where R and W are fixed as given.
We prove two results in this section. First, we show that there exists a threshold z˜
such that firms with z > z˜ adopt the clean technology while firms with z ≤ z˜ do
not. Second, if we denote the previous threshold in environments with and without
product market frictions to be respectively z˜f and z˜n, we show that z˜f > z˜n. The first
result says that there are returns to scale embedded with clean treatment technologies
that are only exploited when firms are large enough. The second result says that by
introducing product market frictions, a positive measure of firms that adopt clean
technology when there are no frictions do not have the profit margin to benefit from
the clean technology, and hence choose to enter the market with dirty technology.
Throughout, we assume 0 < α < 1, 0 < γ < 1, φ0 = 1 and 1 − γ + φ1 > 0. We
impose the last inequality because the product market tax specified in (2.6) is imposed
on talent z. In order for the benefits of higher talent z (the elasticity of profits to
talents 1 − γ) to always out-weight the costs (the elasticity of taxes to talents φ1),
1−γ+φ1 > 0 must be satisfied. This also rules out the case where the most talented
individuals choose to become workers. All proofs are left for the appendix.
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Lemma 1 characterizes firms’ profit functions in the absence of product market
frictions.
Lemma 1. In an economy with no product market frictions, pi0(z) and pi1(z) are both
increasing and linear with respect to z. In addition, the slope of pi1(z) is steeper than
that of pi0(z):
∂pi0(z)
∂z
= (1− pξ)∂pi1(z)
∂z
, ∀z ∈ Z. (2.10)
Lemma 1 highlights the core trade-off of adopting clean technology in our model.
Although the up-front fixed costs shift the overall profit function down by RkE, firms
with clean technology are not subject to the ξ proportion of profits being confiscated.
With constant elasticity between capital and labor, the optimizing capital to labor
ratio is constant in absence of factor market frictions, therefore entrepreneurs reap
economic rents from managerial talents z. These economic rents increase linearly in
z, because we assume a constant returns to scale production function.
Since the tax in (2.6) is size-dependent in the sense that more talented en-
trepreneurs are subject to higher frictions, it is straightforward to show that in an
economy with product market frictions, both pi0(z) and pi1(z) are concave. pi0(z) and
pi1(z) will remain linear if the frictions are uniformly imposed.
Corollary 1. Suppose the product market frictions are specified as max
{
0, 1− zφ1}
with 1−γ+φ1 > 0, then pi0(z) and pi1(z) are both increasing and concave with respect
to z. In addition, the slope of pi1(z) is steeper than that of pi0(z):
∂pi0(z)
∂z
= (1− pξ)∂pi1(z)
∂z
, ∀z ∈ Z.
Since the wage income associated with being a worker is fixed at W , the mono-
tonicity of the profit functions implies that there is a threshold zˆ for which all house-
hold members with talents higher than zˆ choose to become entrepreneurs. Put dif-
ferently, household members choose their occupations according to their comparative
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advantages. This is the standard result from the Lucas model. We summarize it
below in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique threshold zˆ such that all household members
with z < zˆ choose to be workers and those with z ≥ zˆ become entrepreneurs. Further,
zˆ is the solution of W = pi(zˆ).
Finally, Proposition 2 summarizes the main result of this section: larger firms
adopt more advanced treatment technology and the existence of product market fric-
tions impedes the technology upgrade.
Proposition 2. Given kE,W, τz and R, there exist unique thresholds z˜n and z˜f such
that:
(i) In the economy with no product market frictions, entrepreneurs with z ≤ z˜n
produce using dirty technology while those with z > z˜n produce using clean tech-
nology.
(ii) In the economy with product market frictions, entrepreneurs with z ≤ z˜f produce
using dirty technology while those with z > z˜f produce using clean technology.
(iii) z˜n < z˜f , that is, product market frictions impede the technology upgrade.
A graphical illustration of Proposition 2 is shown in Figure 2.7. There are four curves
in the figure, pin0 , pi
f
0 , pi
n
1 and pi
f
1 where superscripts n and f represent whether there are
product market frictions and subscripts 0 and 1 represent firms using dirty or clean
technology respectively. The elasticity of profits to managerial talents is 1− γ when
clean technology is adopted which is larger than that with dirty technology 1−γ+φ1.
Therefore, although for less talented entrepreneurs the fixed installation costs of clean
technology is not justified, for highly talented entrepreneurs using more advanced
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Figure 2.7: The Effect of Product Market Frictions
treatment technologies will eventually pay off. Whether it is worthwhile for firms to
pay the installation costs is determined by contrasting the costs with potential profits
loss from inspections by the regulator. Since the product market frictions shrink the
profit margin by φ1, for some firms their “after-tax” profits do not permit them to
exploit the benefits from adopting more advanced technologies, although the “pre-
tax” profits do. The ultimate result is that a positive measure ∆z(τ) = G(zf )−G(zn)
of firms that with no frictions would produce using clean technology, in the existence
of product market frictions produce using dirty technology.
2.3.5 General Equilibrium
In this section, we specify the household problem and define the general equilib-
rium to close the model.
Household Optimization.—The household engages in a simple consumption saving
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problem:
max
Ct,Kt+1
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct) (2.11)
s.t.
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt = It,
where Ct is the consumption, Kt is the aggregate capital, β is the discount rate, δ
is the depreciation rate, and It is household income which we will specify in detail
shortly. 30 The solution to (2.11) is the standard intertemporal Euler equation
U ′(Ct) = βU ′(Ct+1)(1 +Rt+1 − δ), (2.12)
which pins down the equilibrium interest rate.
Household income It comes from three sources: wage income, firms’ profits and
lump-sum transfers associated with product market frictions τz and environmental
penalties ξ. To characterize It, we need some additional notation. We denote Z0 =
{z ∈ [zˆt, z]|pi0(z) ≥ pi1(z)} as the set of firms operating under dirty technology and
Z1 = {z ∈ [zˆt, z]|pi0(z) < pi1(z)} as the set of firms using clean technology. Notice
that for the intermediate case where 0 < zˆ < z˜ < z, Proposition 2 implies Z0 = [zˆ, z˜)
and Z1 = [z˜, z]. If we let T denote the transfers, which equals taxes in quantity,
Equation (2.9) and Proposition 1 then yield:
It = RtKt +WtG(zˆt) +
∫
z∈Z0
pi0(z)dG(z) +
∫
z∈Z1
pi1(z)dG(z) + T.
where the five terms are capital rental income, wage income and profits from dirty
and clean firms, and government transfers. A law of large numbers here guarantees
30We assume here that the household does not value environmental quality, but values only con-
sumption. The assumption is innocuous in the competitive equilibrium, since the household has no
control over the environmental quality. However, the assumption will matter if a planner’s problem
in considered.
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the ex ante probability of being inspected equals the ex post number of firms that in
fact get inspected.
Now we are ready to define the equilibrium. Let Y be the aggregate output and
E be the aggregate pollution, the steady state equilibrium of the model is defined as
follows.
Definition 1. A steady state equilibrium in this model is the prices {W,R}, alloca-
tions {C,K, Y }, firms’ policy functions {k(z), n(z), y(z), pi(z)}, household’s occupa-
tional choice zˆ, firms’ technology adoption choice z˜, and aggregate pollutants emission
E such that:
(i) Given factor prices {W,R}, {C,K, zˆ} solve the household optimization problem;
(ii) Given factor prices {W,R}, {k(z), n(z), y(z), pi(z)} and z˜ solve firms’ optimiza-
tion problems;
(iii) Factor prices {W,R} clear all markets;
• Labor Market:
G(zˆ) =
∫ z
zˆ
n(z)dG(z).
• Capital Market:
K =
∫ z
zˆ
k(z)dG(z) + kE
∫
z∈Z1
dG(z).
• Product Market:
C +K − (1− δ)K =
∫ z
zˆ
y(z)dG(z).
(iv) The aggregate pollutants discharges are
E =
∫
z∈Z0
e (0, y(z)) dG(z) +
∫
z∈Z1
e (1, y(z)) dG(z).
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2.4 Calibration
We calibrate our model to the Chinese data. The model period is set to be one
year.
Calibration.—Motivated by the empirical evidence in Section I, we assume that the
functional form of the pollution intensity function of firms with treatment technology
i and production level y is log-linear:
log
e
y
= ψ
(i)
0 + ψ
(i)
1 log y. (2.13)
This specification implies that conditional on treatment technology adopted, there is
still “within group” intensity reduction as production scale increases. Since our model
includes only the choices of firms on the end-of-pipe treatment technologies, in the
quantitative exercises, we capture the decrease in pollution intensity in a reduced-form
way. Equation (2.13) implies that the actual discharge is
e = E(i, y) = eψ
(i)
0 y1+ψ
(i)
1 . (2.14)
Our model features only two broad categories of treatment technologies as opposed
to five in the data. We interpret the clean technology in our model as biological tech-
nology and dirty technology as the remaining types. Since the aggregated installation
costs of the physical equipment are less than 9% of those of the biological equipment,
we assume only the installation of biological technology incurs the fixed cost RkE.
Because the firm size distribution in the model is affected by both the talent
distribution G(·) and the product market frictions τz, our identification assumption
is such that parameters governing τz [φ0 and φ1 in Equation (2.6)] are calibrated
according to the empirical regularities in Section II.B (explained in detail shortly
after) and given τz, G(·) is set to match the firm size and employment distribution
in China. We choose the pooled polluting industries as our calibration targets. The
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employment and firm size distributions of these industries pooled together are shown
in the lower-right panels of Figures 2.4 and 2.5. The firm size distribution resembles a
log-normal distribution, but also demonstrates a considerable degree of employment
concentration at very large firms. It is well documented in the literature that the
commonly used log-normal distribution does a reasonably good job at matching the
distribution of the bulk of small and medium-sized firms, but does not support the
concentration of employment. The heavy right tail is crucial to our evaluation because
these are the firms that are producing with clean technology. Since τz is levied
based on the productivity z, we assume the distribution of z′ = (1− τz)z1−γ to be a
combination of two components. The first is a log-normal distribution with mean µ,
standard deviation σ and total probability mass 1− gmax that accounts for the bulk
of small and medium firms. The second is an atomic with value z′max and measure
gmax which accounts for the very large firms.
31 The talent z is then calculated by
z =
(
z′φ1/(γ−1)0
) 1−γ
1−γ+φ1 ,
which gives us G(z).
Therefore, we are left with total of 17 parameters to calibrate: discount factor
β, production technology parameters {A, δ, α, γ}, treatment technology parameters
{ψ(0)0 , ψ(0)1 , ψ(1)0 , ψ(1)1 , kE, pξ}, product market frictions {φ0, φ1} and distributional pa-
rameters {µ, σ, z′max, gmax}. The general strategy of our calibration involves assigning
values to some parameters based on a priori information in the data and calibrate
the rest jointly such that the distance between the moments from the model and the
data is minimized.
Eight of the seventeen parameters can be determined exogenously. We set the de-
preciation rate δ to 10% [Song et al. (2011)]. To get estimates of {ψ(0)0 , ψ(0)1 , ψ(1)0 , ψ(1)1 },
31This strategy follows Guner et al. (2008) and is quite popular among macroeconomic studies on
wealth distribution, see for example ?.
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we repeat the exercises in Section I.B for firms using physical and biological equipment
separately. The estimates are ψ
(0)
0 = −3.5795, ψ(0)1 = −0.4149, ψ(1)0 = −4.4270 and
ψ
(1)
1 = −0.3410. In the context of our model, these estimates suggest that on average,
for two firms with the same level of production but different treatment technology, the
firm that uses biological technology discharges 40% to 60% less pollutants than the
firm equipped with physical technology. We use information on the average products
of capital and labor to calibrate the tax function. Equation (2.3) suggests that the
elasticity of φk to 1− τz is equal to unity. Therefore φ1 is equal to the elasticity of φk
to z. We therefore calculate φk and z according to Section II.B, with R = 0.1 [Hsieh
and Klenow (2009)] and the same γ used later when we are calibrating the model to
match the firm size and employment distributions. We then run a regression
log φki = κ0 + φ1 log zi + εzi ,
which gives us the value for φ1 = −0.03. Given φ1, we then calibrate φ0 such that the
average tax burden in the economy equals the value added tax imposed on Chinese
manufacturing firms in the data, which is 13%. This gives us the value of φ1 =
1.15. We choose to target only the value added tax rate and not include other
frictions because as is shown in Proposition 2, the gains in output (and capital and
consumption as well) from eliminating the product market friction are increasing in
the average level of frictions. Targeting a higher average “tax” rate increases such
gains monotonically, and will not affect the results qualitatively. We therefore choose
a conservative target for the average level of frictions. We set A = 1 as normalization.
The remaining parameters are calibrated jointly. The calibration involves two lay-
ers: an outer layer loops over the parameterization of G(z) and an inner layer solves
the model given G(z). In the inner layer, first we approximate G(z) with 5,000 grid
points. We then choose β and α to match respectively the capital-output ratio of
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1.65 and capital share of 0.5 [both are taken from Bai et al. (2006)] in China. We set
pξ and kE such that the total treatment equipment investment is equal to 1% of the
total output, and the fraction of firms adopting biological equipment equals the em-
pirically observed level of 57%. The value of γ is set such that the difference between
the numbers of firms fall in each bin of the employment and firm size distributions
generated by the model, and those in the data is minimized. More specifically, if we
let sq and sˆq be the number of firms in each bin q (in total ten of them) calculated
from the data and from the model respectively, γ∗ solves
γ∗ = argmin
γ
10∑
q=1
(sq − sˆq)2 . (2.15)
Notice that for each combination of {µ, σ, zmax, gmax}, there is one corresponding γ∗.
Therefore, in the outer layer, we use a multi-dimensional search process to choose
the combination of {µ, σ, zmax, gmax} that minimizes the minimum distances from the
inner layer. Put differently, the outer layer picks the minimum of the right hand side
values of Equation (2.15) when evaluated at γ∗. The model parameters along with
their targets and calibrated values are listed in Table 2.6.
Discussion.—The calibrated model matches very well the capital share, capital-
output ratio, the fraction of treatment equipment in total output and the fraction of
firms adopting biological equipment. The calibrated value of returns to scale γ lies
within the empirically estimated range. 32 The calibrated value of pξ means that
in expectation, the penalty to firms using less advanced treatment technology equals
20.5% of their annual output value.
Figure 2.8 shows graphically the firm size (left panel) and employment share dis-
32The values previously used in the macro literature range from 0.85 [Atkeson and Kehoe (2005)]
at the lower end to 0.95 [Bartelsman et al. (2013)] at the upper end. Estimations from micro-level
data yield similar results, for example Olley and Pakes (1996) estimated the value to be between 0.8
to 0.9 for the U.S telecommunications equipment industry, depending on the particular econometric
specifications.
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Parameter Value Targets
Production A 1 Normalization
δ 0.1000 Depreciation Rate
α 0.5376 Capital Share 0.5
γ 0.9300 Size Distribution†
Treatment ψ
(0)
0 −3.5795 Physical Intensity-output Elasticity
ψ
(0)
1 −0.4149
ψ
(1)
0 −4.4270 Biological Intensity-output Elasticity
ψ
(1)
1 −0.3410
kE 4.1500 Envir.capital-output ratio 1%
pξ 0.205 Frac.Firms Use Bio 57%
Frictions φ0 1.15 Average Value Added Tax 13%
φ1 −0.03 Avg.Factor.Prod-Prod Elasticity
Preference β 0.8750 Capital-output Ratio 1.65
Talents µ −2.4567 Size Distribution†
σ 4.0020
zmax 10820.4
gmax 0.00048
† Note: Jointly calibrated.
Table 2.6: Parameterization
tributions (right panel) in the model and in the data. While not perfect, overall
the model does a reasonable job in matching the two distributions given that there
are five degrees of freedom. The mean (59.27) and median (22.95) of the firm size
distribution, which are not directly targeted in the calibration, also match well with
their empirical counterparts, where the mean and median are equal to 59.05 and 20
respectively. The challenges of calibrating the model to simultaneously match the
employment and size distributions are as follows. First, in order to create the large
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Figure 2.8: Model Fit: Benchmark
firms in the model, we need not only very talented entrepreneurs who are willing to
hire a lot of employees, but also the wage these entrepreneurs face has to be kept
at a low level to make them able to actually hire the desired amount of workers.
Therefore, the average talent in the economy must be low. If we have a wide range of
employment level to cover, the properties of the distributions at the right tail of the
log-normal are difficult to control. It is for this particular reason that we introduce
an atom to the distribution. Second, since for the five industries we are studying in
this paper the employment concentration level is very high, to generate comparable
level of concentration, the returns to scale (γ) must also be high given that the aver-
age talent is low as we just discussed. This will significantly jeopardize the firm size
distribution as the big firms enjoy too many technological advantages. The fit of our
model is thus the compromise of these two forces. 33
The identification assumption of our benchmark calibration is that given taxes
τz, the talent distribution is identified by the size distribution in the data. Another
33Models where these two forces are not very antagonistic to each other usually have much better
fit. For instance, Guner et al. (2008) study the whole U.S business sector which has narrower
employment span and lighter employment concentration. In particular, the largest group they are
targeting is firms with more than 100 employees. On the contrary, the largest group we are targeting
is 400+ employees, which is significantly larger. In another paper, Adamopoulos and Restuccia
(2014) assume away the selection mechanism in the model which, put differently, mutes the general
equilibrium feedback through wages. This relaxes the restriction on the average talents considerably.
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commonly used calibration strategy in the literature takes the U.S as an undistorted
economy (which means τz = 0 in our model) and calibrates G(z) by matching the size
distribution from the tax-free economy to the U.S data. Taxes are then introduced
such that certain moments of the size distribution of the country in interest are
matched. 34 If we calibrate our model in this way, the underlying assumption would
be that the talent distribution of the entrepreneurs in China is the same as that in
the U.S and all the differences between the size distributions of China and the U.S
result from taxes. 35 From our perspective, both strategies have their strength and
weakness, and compromise to data limitations in different ways. The quantitative
results of our paper are to largely driven by size and shape of τz. Therefore, as long
as alternative calibrations imply tax schemes that are similar to what we use in our
benchmark calibration, the quantitative aspects of our results will hold as well. 36
We choose to calibrate our model to the Chinese economy directly because better
empirical evidence (Section II.B) is available to us.
2.5 Quantitative Results
We use the calibrated model as a framework for understanding the effects of firm
size distribution on industrial pollution. We conduct two experiments. In experiment
(i), we eliminate all the product market frictions by setting τz = 0. The experiment
could be interpreted as reductions in inter-regional trade barriers, improvements in
transportation infrastructure, decreases in tax burdens, etc. Since we are following
the indirect approach, we do not have empirical evidence of how much improvements
on observable frictions (for instance the transportation infrastructure) reduces τz by
34 See for example, Guner et al. (2008), Hsieh and Klenow (2009, 2014), and Adamopoulos and
Restuccia (2014) among others.
35The evidence regarding this point is mixed, see Figure 2 in Bloom and Van Reenen (2010).
36In an earlier version of the paper where endogenous treatment technology choice is not explicitly
modeled, we find that this is indeed the case.
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how much. The effects of the policy are then assessed by the changes in the average
firm size across steady states as is done in Guner et al. (2008). In experiment (ii), we
increase the monitoring pξ such that the fraction of firms using biological equipment
reaches the same level as in experiment (i). With this experiment, we approximate
the current environmental policy that punishes firms using less advanced treatment
technology. We contrast results from the two experiments to illustrate the different
effects of these two types of policies.
2.5.1 Less Frictions vs. Stronger Regulation
In this section, we compare the effects of the two types of policies, namely reducing
frictions and intensifying regulation. We start by describing the results of the two
experiments. Table 2.7 contains results that characterize the steady states. Columns
labeled (i) and (ii) refer to experiments (i) and (ii) respectively.
Elimination of Frictions.—The core mechanism that generates the results of ex-
periment (i) is the change of size distribution that is driven by the general equilibrium
wage effect. Since the tax scheme τz is assumed to be size-dependent, which imposes
larger frictions on more productive firms, in the benchmark economy the market share
of these highly productive firms is severely restrained. The elimination of τz removes
these constraints. As a result, the previously suppressed factor demand increases
considerably. In column (i) of Table 2.7, this shows up as a 61% increase in aggre-
gate capital and a 28% increase in wage (output per worker). The size-dependency
of τz also implies that the situation of small unproductive firms improves to a lesser
extent than that of the large productive ones. Many small unproductive firms that
previously survived because of the low prevailing wage now lose their profit mar-
gins. The owners of these firms therefore find it more profitable to work for the more
productive firms. This selection mechanism explains the 125% increase in average
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Statistics Benchmark (i) (ii)
Aggregate Output 100.00 129.72 100.12
Capital 100.00 161.25 100.14
Consumption 100.00 123.45 100.11
Output per Worker 100.00 128.49 99.97
Output per Firm 100.00 298.78 109.76
Average Talent 100.00 224.67 109.49
TFP 100.00 102.00 100.14
Number of Firms 100.00 43.42 91.22
Mean Size 59.27 137.81 65.07
Median Size 22.95 41.83 26.72
Aggregate Pollution 100.00 78.95 90.75
Average Intensity 100.00 60.86 90.65
Biological Share 57.40 85.29 85.15
Monitoring 20.50 20.50 32.50
† Note: All values reported are in percentage points except mean and median size, which
are numbers of workers in absolute term.
Table 2.7: Aggregate and Productivity Effects
talent of active entrepreneurs, the 57% decrease in the number of active firms, the
three-fold increase in output per firm and the increase in the mean and median size
of the firms. Beyond the increase in the cutoff we just described, production is also
more concentrated at firms with high productivity among the remaining firms. We
define the extensive margin as the selection of active entrepreneurs and the intensive
margin as the production distribution among the active firms. The first two rows of
Table 2.8, which report the output share accounted for by firms with productivity in
different quantiles, show this intensive margin. The overall changes of the size and
employment distribution can be seen from the left two panels of Figure 2.9. We see
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Economy QU1 QU2 QU3 QU4 QU5
Benchmark 2.69 4.19 7.29 16.55 69.28
Case (i) 1.50 2.83 6.34 18.06 71.27
Case (ii) 2.93 4.47 7.77 17.37 67.46
† Note: QU1 to QU5 represent respectively the first to the fifth quintile.
Table 2.8: Output Share by Different Managerial Talents Quintile
clearly that firms in the top group expand considerably at the expense of firms in
the bottom three groups. Therefore, elimination of τz improves resource allocation
on both the extensive and intensive margin. Consistent with the findings in Guner
et al. (2008), size distribution in models with firm selection exerts very limited in-
fluence over TFP, which is defined as the Solow residual following standard growth
accounting literature [Hall and Jones (1999)]:
TFP =
Y
(KαN1−α)1−γ
.
Although aggregate output increases by 30%, because the average pollution in-
tensity decreasing more (by 40%), the aggregate pollution in fact decreases by 20%.
The decline in average intensity enters in both the production stage and the treat-
ment stage. In both stages, changes in the size distribution assume a key role. Since
the production in the no friction economy shows higher degree of concentration in
large productive firms, the fact that the two within group elasticities ψ
(0)
1 and ψ
(1)
1
are negative implies mechanically a decrease in pollution intensity. The effect of size
distribution on a firm’s choice of the end-of-pipe treatment technology works exactly
as described in Proposition 2. The elimination of τz increases significantly the profits
of firms, which strengthens the economic incentive of adopting more advanced treat-
ment technology. It is important to bear in mind that both the elimination of τz itself
and the subsequent decrease of wages contribute to the strengthening of the economic
94
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Figure 2.9: Size Distribution: Less Frictions vs. Stronger Regulations
incentive.
To evaluate the relative contribution of reduction in the production stage and in
the treatment stage, we assume artificially that ψ
(0)
0 = ψ
(1)
0 and ψ
(0)
1 = ψ
(1)
1 which
means biological equipment has the same technical features as physical equipment.
We apply this modification to both the benchmark case and the no tax case. We
set the pollution intensity and aggregate pollution in the first case to be the new
benchmark. The difference between the above two cases shows the effect from purely
changing the size distribution, which is equal to 61% for the intensity and 79% for the
aggregate pollution. We interpret these numbers as reduction of industrial pollution
in the production stage. We then express the intensity and pollution in case (i) as
a percentage of the new benchmark. The numbers are respectively 45% for intensity
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and 58% for aggregate pollution. Therefore, in the context of our model, about 30%
of the decrease in pollution intensity and 50% of the decrease in aggregate pollution
are from the treatment stage.
Strengthening of Regulation.—The intensification of regulation affects the de-
cisions of firms directly through technology adoption requirement and indirectly
through the general equilibrium wage feedback. Unlike in experiment (i), these two
effects do not affect the size and employment distributions in equilibrium by too much,
as can be seen from the two right panels in Figure 2.9. There are two reasons behind
this. First, large firms that already have adopted the clean technology in the bench-
mark are not affected by the changes in the policy. Second, the installation costs of
the clean technology in our benchmark calibration are small. As a result, they do not
divert a significant portion of the firms’ resources from productive use, and therefore
do not affect the optimal operating scale of firms by much. As a result, in column
(ii) of the top panel of Table 2.7, the macro aggregates barely change compared to
the benchmark case.
However, despite a tiny decrease (0.03%) in wages, there is selection which to
some extent increases the average size and productivity of active firms. The underly-
ing mechanism here is that an increase in regulation decreases the expected returns
from being an entrepreneur, which drives out the least productive firms that cannot
afford the installation of a clean technology. 37 These household members then
choose to become workers, which increases the labor supply and suppresses equilib-
rium wage rates. The remaining more productive and hence larger firms benefit from
37This prediction matches well the policy practice in China. For example, during 2004 to 2008, the
emission of major air pollutants together with industrial production have declined significantly. The
reduction of per unit GDP emission for these pollutants were 35% for SO2, 29% for Black Carbon and
31% for CO (cf. Lin et al. (2014)). During that period of time, 34 million kW coal-burning electric
generating sets were directly shut down, which amounts to 6.18% of the total electric production in
2013 (National Development and Reform Commission [2009] Decree 4).
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the reduction in wage rates and expand their operating scale, which explains the
increases in size and productivity. Graphically this is reflected in Figure 2.9 as a con-
traction of group “1-19” both in the size and employment distributions and expansion
in other four groups.
Firms in the four expanding groups are not affected equally though. To see this,
we refer to row (ii) in Table 2.8. As is shown in the experiment (i), the most efficient
way of allocating the talents is to shift the production to most productive firms,
increasing the share of output accounted for by firms with productivity in the top
quantiles. However, row (ii) says the opposite. Comparing with the benchmark case,
the proportion of production accounted for by the lower quantiles increases while
that of the top quantile decreases. Therefore, although strengthening the monitoring
improves the allocation of managerial talents on the extensive margin, the allocation
on the intensive margin worsens. Both effects are small here because in our benchmark
calibration kE is small. In Section IV.C, we discuss the case where kE is set to a higher
level.
Since the aggregate output only increases slightly, quantitatively the decreases
in aggregate pollution and intensity are almost the same. In this experiment, they
decrease by about 10%. Since the size and employment distributions do not change
much here, most of the decrease comes from the treatment stage. In fact, if we
repeat the decomposition exercise we did for experiment (i), 92% of the reductions in
both intensity and aggregate pollution stem from by the adoption of more advanced
technologies.
Comparing the Two Policies.—The lesson we learn from the quantitative exercise
is that if resources are devoted to smoothing the frictions in the economy instead of
being used to intensify regulations, reductions of pollution in both the production
and treatment stage arise naturally as equilibrium outcomes. In fact, the effect of
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Statistics Benchmark (i) (i’)
Aggregate Output 100.00 129.72 105.33
Capital 100.00 161.25 106.38
Consumption 100.00 123.45 105.12
Output per Worker 100.00 128.49 104.34
Output per Firm 100.00 298.78 242.61
Aggregate Pollution 100.00 78.95 70.60
Average Intensity 100.00 60.86 67.02
Biological Share 57.40 85.29 72.21
† Note: All values reported are in percentage points.
Table 2.9: The Effect of Size Distribution
regulation policies such as government campaigns are often ineffective for their ease of
rebound. Since the reduction of pollution could be achieved even with less regulations
under the case of no frictions, directing resources at improving economic efficiency
is more likely to be effective in China. Put differently, because elimination of τz
increases output and decreases pollution simultaneously, our results actually suggest
that economic development and environmental protection are not necessarily in sharp
conflict with each other.
2.5.2 The Effect of the Size-Dependency of Distortions
To further isolate the effect of size distribution, we solve a version of the model
where the product market frictions are imposed uniformly over all firms in the econ-
omy. More specifically, in these exercises, we set values of τz such that the total
amount of taxes collected is the same as in the benchmark case with size-dependent
τz. The implied tax rate τz = 18% is higher than the average tax rate in the size-
dependent case, 13%. The results of the experiment are summarized in Table 2.9.
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Columns benchmark and (i) are results of the benchmark calibration and those from
setting τz = 0 respectively. We label the uniform tax case as (i’). By comparing
benchmark with (i’), we are able to assess the effect of the size-dependency of τz.
Similarly, a comparison of (i) with (i’) reveals the effect of levying a flat tax. First
notice that a uniform τz imposed on all firms does not change the extensive margin
comparing to the zero τz situation, therefore measures of average talents, number of
firms, mean/median size of firms and TFP are not affected [see Guner et al. (2008)
for details].
Aggregate output, capital, consumption, output per worker and output per firm
in case (i’) all increase comparing to the benchmark case, which is consistent with
findings about size-dependent distortions in the literature. What is different here is
that since the uniform tax rate needed to generate the same tax revenue is relatively
high (the tax rate for the largest firm in the size-dependent case is 25%), the tax
itself still results in a considerable amount of output loss. The source of output loss
in our model is the misallocation of the entrepreneurial talent z. However, for the
average pollution intensity, much of the reduction is achieved through the elimination
of the size-dependency of τz. The adoption rate of the clean technology increases by
15 percentage points in case (i’), which is 53% of the total increase resulting from the
complete elimination of τz. 84% of the total decline in aggregate pollution in the zero
τz case is achieved by simply removing the size-dependent feature of τz.
Discussion.—The finding that size-dependency of τz affects the economic efficiency
moderately, but the average pollution intensity considerably could be well explained
by the theory established in Hopenhayn (2014). In particular, he shows that size-
dependency of the policy does not necessarily imply large distortions. What matters
for the size of the distortion is the total amount of resources that are affected, not
these resources belong to which firms. Studies like Restuccia and Rogerson (2008)
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and Guner et al. (2008) find that size-dependent policies affect economic efficiency
more than their size-independent counterparts because those size-dependent policies
happen to lead to large amount of resources being affected. The fact that in the
flat tax case we impose a fairly large τz explains why removing size-dependency of
τz does not improve the efficiency of the economy by much. However, for the sake
of industrial pollution, size distribution does matter. Since larger firms produce in a
cleaner way, if the majority of the production is done by large as opposed to small
firms, pollution will in fact decrease. Since the size distribution of the firm is purely
affected by the size-dependency of τz and not by the size of the distortions (in the
definition of Hopenhayn (2014)), although size-dependency does not necessarily imply
significant efficiency loss, it necessarily results in aggravation of pollution.
2.5.3 Environmental Policy and Size Distribution
In our benchmark calibration, we choose a relatively small kE at about 2.5 times
the equilibrium wage of a typical worker. This limits the extent to which environ-
mental policy could affect the real economy. In this section, we show that when kE
is increased to ten times the value used in the benchmark calibration, environmen-
tal policy has sizable effect on the allocation of talents. In particular, we show that
although environmental policy improves the efficiency through selection at the exten-
sive margin (occupational choice), the allocation at the intensive margin (production
distribution among active firms) worsens. To show this, we consider two scenarios. In
the first case, we solve the model again with all parameters remaining at the bench-
mark calibration level, but increase kE to 41.5. With no changes in the regulation
intensity, the adoption rate of clean technology decreases. Therefore, in the second
case, we increase pξ such that the adoption rate in the benchmark case (57%) is
restored. We label these two experiments by (iii) and (iv).
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Statistics Benchmark (iii) (iv)
Aggregate Output 100.00 100.00 100.41
Capital 100.00 100.28 101.45
Consumption 100.00 99.94 100.21
Output per Worker 100.00 100.00 99.63
Output per Firm 100.00 100.00 187.70
Average Talent 100.00 100.00 184.14
TFP 100.00 100.00 100.81
Number of Firms 100.00 100.00 53.50
Mean Size 59.27 59.27 111.65
Median Size 22.95 22.95 63.24
Aggregate Pollution 100.00 125.64 87.56
Average Intensity 100.00 125.64 87.20
Biological Share 57.40 8.89 57.06
Monitoring 20.50 20.50 73.50
† Note: All values reported are in percentage points except mean and median size, which
are numbers of workers in absolute term.
Table 2.10: Aggregate and Productivity Effects: Higher kE
The results of experiments (iii) and (iv) are shown in Table 2.10. First we notice
that the size distribution as well as the efficiency of the economy stay virtually the
same as the benchmark case. The clean technology adoption rate falls to 9%, since
a large number of firms now find it unprofitable to use more advanced treatment
technology and a higher level of pollution follows. This result suggests that subsidies
to treatment technology upgrading can work as a substitute for stronger regulation.
If we increase the regulation to the level such that the original technology adoption
rate is restored, as opposed to the results of case (ii) where size distributions and
the allocation of resources are only mildly affected, the changes in experiment (iv)
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Figure 2.10: Environmental Policy and Size Distribution
Economy QU1 QU2 QU3 QU4 QU5
Benchmark 2.69 4.19 7.29 16.55 69.28
Case (iv) 4.44 6.63 10.98 21.86 56.10
Case (i) 1.50 2.83 6.34 18.06 71.27
† Note: QU1 to QU5 represent respectively the first to the fifth quintile.
Table 2.11: Allocation of Production at the Intensive Margin: High kE
are enormous. The size and employment distributions for case (iv) are shown in
Figure 2.10. In contrast to the size and employment distributions in the benchmark
case, all firms in the first group are driven out. This is also reflected in column
(iv) of Table 2.10 as increases in average talent and mean/median size of the firms.
Therefore environmental policy improves resource allocation at the extensive margin
by forcing small unproductive firms to quit the market. However, the gains from
these improvements are limited because the allocation of resources at the intensive
margin worsens. Table 2.11 shows the allocation of resources at the intensive margin.
The efficient allocation at the intensive margin is achieved in the no size-dependent
τz case, which is shown again here in row (i). Instead of an allocation of production
toward larger firms, as in the efficient case, here the production of firms in the bottom
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four quantiles expands significantly at the expense of production share of the most
productive firms. As a result, much of the gains in economic efficiency are offset by
the worsening of resource allocations at the intensive margin. Although the level of
industrial pollution gets lower, the reduction could be much larger if the allocation
at the intensive margin was also improved, as is in the case of elimination of τz.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, using a unique micro-level manufacturing census, we find a strong
negative correlation between firm size and pollution intensity in production. We also
document substantial differences in firm size and employment distributions between
China and the U.S. We find empirical evidence which suggests that size-dependent
product market frictions contribute significantly to these observed differences. We
use a quantitative framework to organize these empirical regularities, and to study
the implication of firm size distribution on industrial pollution at the aggregate level.
Quantitative analysis shows that firm size distribution has a sizable impact on indus-
trial pollution. Our results imply that traditional productivity-oriented measures of
the costs of size-dependent policies underestimate the true costs of these policies, be-
cause industrial pollution, which arguably affects households’ welfare, is not accounted
for in previous studies. Furthermore, our results suggest an alternative approach to
reducing the discharge of industrial pollutants, which focuses on elimination of the
economic frictions.
GDP-oriented promotion scheme is often identified as the cause of China’s heavy
industrial pollution. Our paper shows that growth-enhancing policies that smooth the
frictions in the market could foster economic growth and reduce pollutants discharge
at the same time. To this end, identifying observable factors that generate the product
market frictions and designing optimal environmental policies are very important
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directions to pursue in future studies. Our model is constructed to facilitate steady
state comparisons and, as a result, abstracts from features that could be pertinent for
the analysis of short-run policy effects. Extending our model to allow for short-run
dynamic path and firm’s life-cycle analysis is important to further our understanding
of the costs and benefits of certain pollution reduction policies.
In our paper, we focus on industrial water pollution (more specifically Chemical
Oxygen Demand) and the case of China. However, the conclusions in our paper could
be generalized to other pollutants and cross-country comparisons that involve more
countries. For instance, small capacity coal-burning plants are widely acknowledged
to be the main source of the emission of sulfur dioxide resulting in acid rain that affects
a wide range of areas in China. There are studies using micro-level manufacturing
census of firms’ production and emissions of other countries [Barrows and Ollivier
(2014), Shapiro and Walker (2015) and Dardati (2014)], cross-country comparisons
are therefore important directions to pursue. It is also interesting to study the ge-
ographical concentration of firms and pollution using a macroeconomic framework.
We leave these extensions to future research.
104
REFERENCES
Acemoglu, D., P. Aghion, L. Bursztyn and D. Hemous, “The environment and
directed technical change”, American Economic Review 102, 1, 131–166, URL
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.1.131 (2012).
Adamopoulos, T., “Transportation costs, agricultural productivity and cross-country
income differences”, International Economic Review 52, 2, 489–521 (2011).
Adamopoulos, T. and D. Restuccia, “The size distribution of farms and international
productivity difference”, American Economic Review 104, 6, 1667–1697 (2014).
Atkeson, A. and A. T. Burstein, “Innovation, firm dynamics, and international trade”,
Journal of Political Economy 118, 3, 433–484 (2010).
Atkeson, A. and P. J. Kehoe, “Modeling and measuring organization capital”, Journal
of Political Economy 113, 5, 1026–1053 (2005).
Axtell, R. L., “Zipf distribution of U.S. firm sizes”, Science 293, 5536, 1818–1820
(2001).
Bai, C.-E., C.-T. Hsieh and Y. Qian, “The return to capital in china”, Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 2006, 2, 61–88 (2006).
Barrows, G. and H. Ollivier, “Does trade make firms cleaner? Theory and evidence
from Indian manufacturing”, Manuscript (2014).
Bartelsman, E., J. Haltiwanger and S. Scarpetta, “Cross-country differences in pro-
ductivity: The role of allocation and selection”, American Economic Review 103, 1,
305–334, URL http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.103.
1.305 (2013).
Becker, R. and V. Henderson, “Effects of air quality regulations on polluting indus-
tries”, Journal of Political Economy 108, 2, 379–421, URL http://www.jstor.
org/stable/10.1086/262123 (2000).
Benabou, R., “Tax and Education Policy in a Heterogeneous-Agent Economy: What
Levels of Redistribution Maximize Growth and Efficiency?”, Econometrica 70, 2,
481–517, URL https://ideas.repec.org/a/ecm/emetrp/v70y2002i2p481-517.
html (2002).
Bento, P. and D. Restuccia, “Misallocation, Establishment Size, and Productivity”,
, tecipa-517, URL https://ideas.repec.org/p/tor/tecipa/tecipa-517.html
(2014).
Bloom, N., B. Eifert, A. Mahajan, D. McKenzie and J. Roberts, “Does management
matter? evidence from India”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 128, 1, 1–51
(2013).
105
Bloom, N., C. Genakos, R. Martin and R. Sadun, “Modern management: Good for
the environment or just hot air?”, Economic Journal 120, 544, 551–572 (2010).
Bloom, N. and J. Van Reenen, “Why do management practices differ across firms
and countries?”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 24, 1, 203–224 (2010).
Brandt, L., J. V. Biesebroeck and Y. Zhang, “Creative accounting or creative de-
struction? firm-level productivity growth in chinese manufacturing”, Journal of
Development Economics 97, 2, 339–351, URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S0304387811000216 (2012).
Brandt, L., T. Tombe and X. Zhu, “Factor market distrotions across time, space and
sectors in china”, Review of Economic Dynamics 16, 1, 39–58 (2013).
Clarke, S., “New deal regulation and the revolution in american farm productivity: A
case study of the diffusion of the tractor in the corn belt, 1920—1940”, The Jour-
nal of Economic History 51, 1, 101–123, URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/
2123053 (1991).
Copeland, B. R. and M. S. Taylor, “Trade, growth, and the environment”, Journal of
Economic Literature 42, 1, 7–71, URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/3217036
(2004).
Dardati, E., “Pollution permit systems and firm dynamics: How does the allocation
scheme matter?”, International Economic Review (2014).
Dasgupta, S., B. Laplante, N. Mamingi and H. Wang, “Inspections, pollution prices
and environmental performance: Evidence from china”, Ecological Economics 36,
3, 487–498 (2001).
Dasgupta, S., R. E. Lucas and D. Wheeler, “Small plants, pollution and poverty:
New evidence from brazil and mexico”, World Bank (1998).
Davis, S. J., J. Haltiwanger, R. Jarmin and J. Miranda, “Volatility and Dispersion in
Business Growth Rates: Publicly Traded versus Privately Held Firms”, in “NBER
Macroeconomics Annual 2006, Volume 21”, NBER Chapters, pp. 107–180 (National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, 2007), URL https://ideas.repec.org/h/
nbr/nberch/11178.html.
Dinlersoz, E., J. Greenwood and H. Hyatt, “Who do Unions Target? Unionization
over the Life-Cycle of U.S. Businesses”, , 20151, URL https://ideas.repec.org/
p/nbr/nberwo/20151.html (2014).
Eaton, J. and S. Kortum, “Technology, Geography, and Trade”, Econo-
metrica 70, 5, 1741–1779, URL https://ideas.repec.org/a/ecm/emetrp/
v70y2002i5p1741-1779.html (2002).
Ebenstein, A., “The consequences of industrialization: Evidence from water pollution
and digestive cancers in china”, The Review of Economics and Statistics 94, 1, 186–
201 (2012).
106
Economy, E. C., The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s
Future (Cornell University Press, 2004).
Foster, L., J. Haltiwanger and C. J. Krizan, “Market Selection, Reallocation, and
Restructuring in the U.S. Retail Trade Sector in the 1990s”, The Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics 88, 4, 748–758, URL https://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/
restat/v88y2006i4p748-758.html (2006).
Goulder, L. H., “Environmental taxation and the “double dividend”: A reader’s
guide”, NBER Working Paper No. 4896 (1994).
Graff Zivin, J. and M. Neidell, “Environment, health, and human capital”, Journal
of Economic Literature 51, 3, 689–730, URL http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.
php?doi=10.1257/jel.51.3.689 (2013).
Grossman, G. M. and A. B. Krueger, “Environmental impacts of a north american
free trade agreement”, in “The U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement”, edited by
P. M. Garber (MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1993).
Grossman, G. M. and A. B. Krueger, “Economic growth and the environment”, The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 2, 353–377, URL http://www.jstor.org/
stable/2118443 (1995).
Grossman, G. M. and E. Rossi-Hansberg, “Trading Tasks: A Simple Theory of
Offshoring”, American Economic Review 98, 5, 1978–97, URL https://ideas.
repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v98y2008i5p1978-97.html (2008).
Guner, N., A. Parkhomenko and G. Ventura, “Managers and Productivity Dif-
ferences”, , 9586, URL https://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp9586.html
(2015).
Guner, N., G. Ventura and Y. Xu, “Macroeconomic implications of size-dependent
policies”, Review of Economic Dynamics 11, 4, 721–744 (2008).
Hall, R. E. and C. I. Jones, “Why do some countries produce so much more output
per worker than others?”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 1, 83–116
(1999).
Head, K. and J. Ries, “FDI as an outcome of the market for corporate control:
Theory and evidence”, Journal of International Economics 74, 1, 2–20, URL https:
//ideas.repec.org/a/eee/inecon/v74y2008i1p2-20.html (2008).
Hopenhayn, H. A., “Entry, exit, and firm dynamics in long run equilibrium”, Econo-
metrica 60, 5, 1127–1150, URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/2951541 (1992).
Hopenhayn, H. A., “On the measure of distortions”, NBER Working Paper No. 20404
(2014).
Hopenhayn, H. A. and R. Rogerson, “Job turnover and policy evaluation: A general
equilibrium analysis”, Journal of Political Economy 101, 5, 915–938, URL http:
//www.jstor.org/stable/2138602 (1993).
107
Hsieh, C.-T. and P. J. Klenow, “Misallocation and manufacturing TFP in China
and India”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 124, 4, 1403–1448, URL http:
//qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/124/4/1403.abstract (2009).
Hsieh, C.-T. and P. J. Klenow, “The life-cycle of plants in India and Mexico”, The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 129, 3, 1035–1084 (2014).
Hsieh, C.-T. and B. A. Olken, “The missing “missing middle””, Journal of Economic
Perspectives 28, 3, 89–108 (2014).
Jia, R., “Pollution for promotion”, Manuscript (2014).
Jiang, L., C. Lin and P. Lin, “The determinants of pollution levels: Firm-level ev-
idence from chinese manufacturing”, Journal of Comparative Economics 42, 1,
118–142 (2014).
Kapika, M., “How Important Is Technology Capital for the United States?”, American
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 4, 2, 218–48, URL https://ideas.repec.
org/a/aea/aejmac/v4y2012i2p218-48.html (2012).
Kuznets, S., “Economic growth and income inequality”, The American Economic
Review 45, 1, 1–28 (1955).
Lagakos, D., “Explaining cross-country productivity differences in retail trade”, Jour-
nal of Political Economy, forthcoming (2016).
Lin, J., D. Pan, S. J. Davis, Q. Zhang, K. He, C. Wang, D. G. Streets, D. J. Wuebbles
and D. Guan, “Chinas international trade and air pollution in the united states.”,
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111, 5, 1736–1741 (2014).
Lucas, R. E. J., “On the size distribution of business firms”, The Bell Journal of
Economics 9, 2, 508–523, URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/3003596 (1978).
Luttmer, E. G. J., “Selection, growth and the size distribution of firms”, The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 122, 3, 1103–1144 (2007).
Markusen, J. R., “Multinationals, multi-plant economies, and the gains from trade”,
Journal of International Economics 16, 3-4, 205–226, URL https://ideas.repec.
org/a/eee/inecon/v16y1984i3-4p205-226.html (1984).
McGrattan, E. R. and E. C. Prescott, “Openness, technology capital, and devel-
opment”, Journal of Economic Theory 144, 6, 2454–2476, URL https://ideas.
repec.org/a/eee/jetheo/v144y2009i6p2454-2476.html (2009).
McGrattan, E. R. and E. C. Prescott, “Technology Capital and the US Current
Account”, American Economic Review 100, 4, 1493–1522, URL https://ideas.
repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v100y2010i4p1493-1522.html (2010).
Melitz, M. J., “The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate
industry productivity”, Econometrica 71, 6, 1695–1725, URL http://www.jstor.
org/stable/1555536 (2003).
108
Melitz, M. J. and G. I. P. Ottaviano, “Market size, trade and productivity”, Review
of Economic Studies 75, 1, 295–316 (2008).
Olley, G. S. and A. Pakes, “The dynamics of productivity in the telecommunications
equipment industry”, Econometrica 64, 6, 1263–1297 (1996).
Olmstead, A. L. and P. W. Rhode, “Reshaping the landscape: The impact and diffu-
sion of the tractor in american agriculture, 1910—1960”, The Journal of Economic
History 61, 3, 663–698, URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/2698132 (2001).
Parente, S. L. and E. C. Prescott, “Barriers to technology adoption and development”,
The Journal of Political Economy 102, 2, 298–321 (1994).
Poschke, M., “The firm size distribution across countries and skill-biased change in
entrepreneurial technology”, Manuscript (2015).
Ramondo, N., “A quantitative approach to multinational production”, Journal of
International Economics 93, 1, 108–122, URL https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/
inecon/v93y2014i1p108-122.html (2014).
Restuccia, D. and R. Rogerson, “Policy distortions and aggregate productivity with
heterogeneous establishments”, Review of Economic Dynamics 11, 4, 707–720
(2008).
Restuccia, D. and R. Rogerson, “Misallocation and productivity”, Review of Eco-
nomic Dynamics 16, 1, 1–10 (2013).
Rossi-Hansberg, E. and M. L. J. Wright, “Establishment size dynamics in the aggre-
gate economy”, American Economic Review 97, 5, 1639–1666 (2007).
Schankerman, M. and A. Pakes, “Estimates of the Value of Patent Rights in European
Countries during the Post-1950 Period”, Economic Journal 96, 384, 1052–76, URL
https://ideas.repec.org/a/ecj/econjl/v96y1986i384p1052-76.html (1986).
Shadbegian, R. J. and W. B. Gray, “Pollution abatement expenditures and plant-
level productivity: A production function approach”, Ecological Economics 54, 2,
196–208 (2005).
Shapiro, J. S. and R. Walker, “Why is pollution from U.S. manufacturing declining?
the roles of trade, regulation, productivity and preferences”, NBER Working Paper
No. 20879 (2015).
Song, Z., K. Storesletten and F. Zilibotti, “Growing like China”, American Economic
Review 101, 1, 196–233 (2011).
Song, Z. and G. Wu, “Identifying capital misallocation”, Manuscript (2015).
Tombe, T. and X. Zhu, “Trade, migration and productivity: A quantitative analysis
of china”, Manuscript (2015).
109
Vennemo, H., K. Aunan, H. Lindhjem and H. M. Seip, “Environmental pollution
in china: Status and trends.”, Review of Environmental Economics and Policy
3, 2, 209–230, URL https://libproxy.cc.stonybrook.edu/login?url=http:
//search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=eih&AN=44545982&
site=ehost-live&scope=site (2009).
Veracierto, M., “Employment Flows, Capital Mobility, and Policy Analysis”, Interna-
tional Economic Review 42, 3, 571–95, URL https://ideas.repec.org/a/ier/
iecrev/v42y2001i3p571-95.html (2001).
Wang, J. and J. Whalley, “Are chinese markets for manufactured products more
competitive than in the us? a comparison of china-us industrial concentration
ratios”, NBER Working Paper 19898 (2014).
Wang, M., M. Webber, B. Finlayson and J. Barnett, “Rural industries and water
pollution in china”, Journal of Environmental Management 86, 4, 648–659 (2008).
World Bank, China Air, Land and Water: Environmental Priorities for a New Mil-
lenium (World Bank Publications, Washington DC, 2001).
Yang, G. and D. Zhuang, Atlas of the Huai River Basin Water Environment: Diges-
tive Cancer Mortality (Springer, New York, 2014).
Young, A., “The razor’s edge: Distortions and incremental reform in the people’s
republic of china”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 4, 1091–1135 (2000).
Zhang, J., “The impact of water quality on health: Evidence from the drink-
ing water infrastructure program in rural china”, Journal of Health Economics
31, 1, 122–134, URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0167629611001172 (2012).
Zheng, S. and M. E. Kahn, “Understanding china’s urban pollution dynamics”,
Journal of Economic Literature 51, 3, 731–772, URL http://www.aeaweb.org/
articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.51.3.731 (2013).
110
APPENDIX A
ACCOUNTING EXERCISES FOR CHAPTER 2
111
This appendix provides robustness calculations of the accounting exercises.
Estimation Strategies.—Ideally, we would like to have the pollution intensity over
firm size. However, such data do not exist since the NGSPS only reports total value
of production and total amount of pollution. Therefore, we would need to construct
pollution intensity over the number of employees. We use the CNEC for this purpose.
In particular, we estimate the corresponding bins for production for each employment
bin from the U.S data.
SUSB reports firm size in 22 bins. For the U.S size bins, we construct the corre-
sponding production bins to be used in NGSPS. CNES is used to bridge the employ-
ment bins (SUSB) to the production bins (NGSPS).
1. Non-parametric:
• For each U.S employment bin, we compute the 1st quartile and 3rd quartile
production levels for Chinese firms within that employment bin. The two
quartiles are used as the lower and upper bounds for the production bins
in NGSPS.
• We then use the median pollution intensity of firms within the newly de-
fined production bins as the average pollution intensity for those bins.
• Lastly, we calculate the aggregate pollution by assigning to each bin the
corresponding share of production. The NGSPS production bins are used
for China and the employment bins are used for U.S.
2. Piecewise Linear :
• For each U.S employment bin, we regress log-product on log-employment
using the subset of Chinese firms within that employment bin. The lower
and upper bounds for the production bins in this case are calculated as
the predicted value of the above regression.
• We then run piecewise log-linear regression of pollution intensity on pro-
duction within each new production bin. The average pollution intensity
is chosen to be the predicted intensity at the midpoint of the new log-
production bin.
• Lastly, the average intensity is applied to the production share distribu-
tions. The U.S distribution does not change, however, a new distribution
for China is calculated since the endpoints of the production bins are dif-
ferent.
3. Parametric:
• Using CNEC, we regress log-production on log-number of workers, which
yields a parametric relationship between the number of workers and pro-
duction.
• Using NGSPS, we regress log-intensity on log-production, which yields a
parametric relationship between intensity and production. From these two
relationships, we can subsequently construct a new parametric relationship
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Methods Paper Agri Tex Chem Bever Avg Reduc
Non-parametric 39.8% 60.7% 81.6% 102.5% 103.7% 63.5% 28.2%
Piecewise-linear 34.8% 69.4% 93.5% 180.1% N/Aa 75.4% 19.0%
Parametric 43.5% 61.1% 97.5% 101.2% 89.0% 67.0% 25.5%
† Note: Please see notes of Table 2.2 for acronyms of industries. For individual
industries, the numbers reported are the aggregate pollution from the artificial
U.S production structure as percentage from that of China. We use the 1st and
3rd quartile in the non-parametric calculation. Column 6 (Ave) calculates the
weighted average of these ratios using the percentage contribution in row one of
Table 2.2 as weights. Column 7 (Reduc) reports the aggregate reduction, which
is simply the average without normalization.
a Since the beverage industry has a lot fewer firms than the others, there are
employment size bins with no corresponding firms in China, which invalidates
the method. We set the ratio to 100% in the calculation of the last two averages.
Table A.1: Size Distribution on Pollution
between intensity and number of employees. The average intensity is cho-
sen to be the midpoint of each U.S employment bin. Notice that in this
case we have a direct functional form for employment and intensity).
• Lastly, the average intensity is applied to the production share distribu-
tions. The U.S distribution does not change, but a new distribution for
China is calculated since the endpoints of the production bins are different.
Notice that this distribution for China is the one we use in Section I.C.
The estimation results are shown in Table A.1. Each of these three methods has
its own advantages and disadvantages. The two non-parametric methods capture
more of the variation at the local level, which could be washed out in a parametric
estimation across the whole state space. However, this local nature also introduces a
lot of instability on the estimations. Further, there are situations when there are gaps
not covered by adjacent production bins and situations when these production bins
overlap with each other. Under these conditions, some information will be lost while
other is used for multiple times. Nevertheless, the results are robust across different
estimation strategies.
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In this section we provide formal proofs to the results in Section II.C. For conve-
nience, we state those results here again.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2:
Lemma 2. In an economy with no product market frictions, pi0(z) and pi1(z) are both
increasing and linear with respect to z. In addition, the slope of pi1(z) is steeper than
that of pi0(z):
∂pi0(z)
∂z
= (1− pξ)∂pi1(z)
∂z
, ∀z ∈ Z (B.1)
Proof. Since kE is sunk-cost, it does not affect firms’ decision once is paid. The factor
demand decisions for the two types of firms are therefore the same. The first order
conditions for capital and labor are respectively
∂pii(z)
∂k
: αγz1−γkαγ−1n(1−α)γ = R (B.2)
∂pii(z)
∂n
: (1− α)γz1−γkαγn(1−α)γ−1 = W, i = 0, 1 (B.3)
Dividing (B.2) with (B.3) yields constant capital to labor ratio h
h =
k
n
=
αW
(1− α)R (B.4)
which says more capital is demanded when technology is capital intensive (higher
α) or when capital rental price R low. Notice that the system of equations (B.2)
with (B.3) is log-linear and thus has closed-form solution. With some algebra, the
solutions are characterized by
n(z) = Φ1R
αγ
γ−1W
1−αγ
γ−1 · z, Φ1 =
[
(1− α)αγ
(1− α)γααγ
] 1
γ−1
(B.5)
k(z) = Φ2R
1+γ(α−1)
γ−1 W
γ(1−α)
γ−1 · z, Φ2 = α
1− αΦ1 (B.6)
Substitute the optimal solutions (B.5) and (B.6) back to the definition of profits
functions (2.8) and (2.9), we have
pi0(z) = (1− pξ)
(
Ω− 1
1− αΦ1
)
κz, Ω =
(
α
1− α
)αγ
Φγ1 and κ = W
γ(1−α)
γ−1 R
αγ
γ−1
pi1(z) =
(
Ω− 1
1− αΦ1
)
κz −RkE
where it is clear that both functions are increasing and linear in z and (B.1) is true.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2:
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Corollary 2. Suppose the product market frictions are specified as max
{
0, 1− zφ1}
with 1−γ+φ1 > 0, then pi0(z) and pi1(z) are both increasing and concave with respect
to z. In addition, the slope of pi1(z) is steeper than that of pi0(z):
∂pi0(z)
∂z
= (1− pξ)∂pi1(z)
∂z
, ∀z ∈ Z
Proof. The proof is straightforward given Lemma 2. Substituting in the tax function,
pi0(z) and pi1(z) now becomes
pi0(z) = (1− pξ)
(
Ω− 1
1− αΦ1
)
κz
1−γ+φ1
1−γ
pi1(z) =
(
Ω− 1
1− αΦ1
)
κz
1−γ+φ1
1−γ −RkE
where Ω,Φ1 and κ are defined as in Lemma 2.
Assumption 1− γ + φ1 > 0 guarantees the monotonicity of the profits functions.
Concavity is easily verified by taking second order derivatives.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
Proposition 3. There exists a unique threshold zˆ such that all household members
with z ≤ zˆ choose to be workers and those with z ≥ zˆ become entrepreneurs. Further,
zˆ is the solution of W = pi(zˆ)
Proof. Since the overall profit function pi(z) is the upper envelope of pi0(z) and pi1(z),
from Lemma 2 and 2 we know pi(z) is monotonic increasing. It is easy to verify that
pi(0) = 0. Therefore, as long as 0 < W < pi(z), we can find a unique zˆ such that
pi(zˆ) = W , where uniqueness follows from monotonicity. The condition 0 < W < pi(z)
is guaranteed in the general equilibrium version of our model by Inada condition on
the production function.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4:
Proposition 4. Given kE,W, τz and R, there exist unique thresholds z˜n and z˜f such
that:
(i) In the economy with no product market frictions, entrepreneurs with z ≤ z˜n
produce using dirty technology while those with z > z˜n produce using clean tech-
nology.
(ii) In the economy with product market frictions, entrepreneurs with z ≤ z˜f produce
using dirty technology while those with z > z˜f produce using clean technology.
(iii) z˜n < z˜f , that is, product market frictions impede the technology upgrade.
Proof. Uniqueness follows from
∂pi0(z)
∂z
= (1− pξ)∂pi1(z)
∂z
, ∀z ∈ Z
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and monotonicity under both the case with and without frictions.
We can solve for analytical expression for zn:
zn =
RkE
pξ
[
Ωκγ − 1
1−ακ
] (B.7)
where zn is simply the “distance” (RkE) over “speed” (pφ
[
Ωκγ − 1
1−ακ
]
). The “dis-
tance” in both cases are the same, so eventually whether zf lies left or right to zn
depends on the “speed” of convergence.
Using expressions of the profits functions with frictions, we can show that
zn =
RkE
pξ
[
Ω− 1
1−α
]
κ
<
(
RkE
pξ
[
Ω− 1
1−α
]
κ
) 1−γ
1−γ+φ1
= z∗f (B.8)
which proves the proposition.
One caveat is that the second inequality holds only if the number in the parenthe-
ses is greater than 1. We verify this in our quantitative analysis but restrain ourselves
from discussing extreme cases where the condition is not hold.
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In the paper, we model the costs of adopting abatement technology as a fixed
costs kE, regardless of the production scale of firms. The readers may concern that
this could be a mis-specification. Two alternatives arise naturally: fixed costs plus
operating costs and scale-related fixed costs. In this section, we show that each
alternative contradicts some of the empirical evidence we document from the data.
Operating Costs.—We start with the case of operating costs. Trimming the top
1% observations for outliers, the distribution of the ratio of operating costs over total
value of production is shown in Table C.1. On average, operating costs of abatement
Minimum 25% 50% 75% Maximum Mean
0 0.0013 0.0049 0.0143 0.2084 0.0150
Table C.1: Operating Costs as a Fraction of Output
equipment takes about 1.5% of a firm’s annual value of production. In addition, the
median of the ratio is less than 0.5%, suggesting that operating costs are negligible
for more than 50% of the firms. For conciseness consideration, we choose to omit
them from the model.
Fixed Costs Proportional to Production Level.—We do observe in the data that
firms with larger production scale tend to make larger investment in abatement equip-
ments. For instance, the correlation between the log value of production and abate-
ment equipment investment is equal to 0.64. However, the relationship significantly
weakens if we remove the percentage interpretation implied by taking logarithmic. In
fact, if we calculate the ratio of abatement equipment investment over total produc-
tion of firms below certain quantiles, the ratio decreases gradually as we include more
large firms into the calculation. Table C.2 reports the ratio of aggregate treatment
equipments installation costs as a fraction of aggregate value of output when firms
with size below certain quantiles are included. Recall that we have documented that
25% 40% 60% 80% 95%
0.6195 0.2475 0.1151 0.0668 0.0433
Table C.2: Installation Costs as a Fraction of Output
the unit-cost per processing capacity is also decreasing with the equipment capacity,
together these facts suggest the existence of returns to scale of treatment equipments.
Relative Prices of Physical versus Biological Equipment.—We assume in the main
text that only the installation of biological equipments requires a fixed costs. In this
paragraph, we provide evidence in support of this choice. The distributions of prices
for physical and biological equipments in absolute term (CNY 10,000 in year 2007)
are listed in Table C.3. As is shown in Table C.3, the costs of biological equipments
is 7 to 15 times of those of the physical equipments. We further calculate the ratio
of aggregate treatment equipments installation costs as a fraction of aggregate value
of output for different technologies. We find that the ratio is 3.07% for physical
technology and 12.83% for biological technology. In addition, the total investment of
physical equipment over biological equipment is 0.087, meaning that the installation
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Technologies Minimum 25% 50% 75% Maximum Mean
Physical 0.002 2.000 6.000 25.000 800.000 36.140
Biological 0.04 30.00 85.00 260.00 4000.00 249.90
Table C.3: Relative Prices of Treatment Equipments
costs of physical equipments when aggregated across the economy are only 9% of
those of the biological equipments.
These evidence suggest that comparing to biological equipment, the costs of in-
stalling physical treatment equipments are nearly negligible. Therefore in our later
calculation we assume that only the adoption of biological equipment is costly.
In summary, the evidence suggests that firms’ investment in abatement equipment
is increasing with production scale but to a much lesser extent in absolute term.
Again for simplicity and without loss of generality, we choose the fixed costs modeling
strategy.
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